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Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

Maryland District Court Finds Damages Award, Not Liability Award Was “Final” Decision Triggering Time to Challenge Award Under FAA

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The plaintiff moved to vacate an arbitration award and the defendant moved to dismiss and confirm. The defendant’s dismissal motion challenged confirmation of an arbitration award, arguing that the matter was filed in violation of the arbitration agreement’s confidentiality clause, was prohibited by the defense of arbitration and award, failed to comply with the Federal Arbitration Act, was untimely, and failed to include any legal authority.

The court dispensed with the defendant’s first argument, as the arbitration agreement expressly preserved the parties’ statutory right to judicial review of arbitration proceedings. As to the second argument – that confirmation is prohibited by the defense of arbitration and award – the court noted that the plaintiff was not attempting to re-litigate the claims that were resolved by the arbitration but rather “exercise its statutory right to request that a district court vacate the arbitration award.”

As to the third argument, timeliness, the FAA requires that a party challenging an arbitration award serve notice on the adverse part “within three months after the award is filed or delivered,” which period begins to run once the arbitrator issues its final award. Here, the liability award was issued on July 9, 2018, and the damages award on January 3, 2019. Thus, the plaintiff’s complaint, filed on January 25, 2019, was within the three-month period. Additionally, “[a]lthough the FAA provides that the sole method for challenging an arbitration award is by serving a motion to vacate within three months of the final award and does not expressly permit a party to initiate a challenge to an arbitration award by filing a complaint, a court may construe a complaint challenging an arbitration decision as a motion to vacate when doing so would not prejudice the opposing party.” Finding no prejudice, the court rejected the defendant’s third argument.

As to the fourth argument – that the plaintiff failed to include any legal authority to support vacating the arbitration award – the court noted that, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, its “role is not to determine whether a party has proven its case” but rather “to determine whether a party has stated a claim for which relief can be granted.” Finding that the complaint met this requirement, the court rejected the defendant’s argument.

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the arbitrator exceeded her legal authority and manifestly disregarded the law, and confirmed the award.

Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. Myers, No. 8:19-cv-00242 (D. Md. Dec. 3, 2019).

Connecticut Supreme Court to Consider Whether Parties Can Use FAA to Extend Time to Vacate Arbitration Award

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The Connecticut Supreme Court will consider whether the parties to an arbitration agreement can circumvent Connecticut’s 30-day statutory deadline for filing an application to vacate an arbitration award by including in the arbitration agreement a choice-of-law provision stating that the agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, which contains a three-month time limitation for filing applications to vacate arbitration decisions.

In A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint Paul, 192 Conn. App. 245 (2019), the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s application to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the application was untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after the award. Under a Connecticut statute, “[n]o motion to vacate, modify or correct an award may be made after thirty days from the notice of the award to the party to the arbitration who makes the motion.” The appellate court concluded as a matter of law that parties may not circumvent that statute by agreeing to have the FAA’s three-month limitation period apply. Thus, even though the arbitration agreement at issue provided that “[a]ny arbitration under this Arbitration Provision shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act … and not by any state law concerning arbitration,” Connecticut’s 30-day limitation applied.

A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint Paul, 192 Conn. App. 245 (2019).

Texas Magistrate Denies Motion for Attorneys’ Fees Incurred in Seeking Confirmation of Arbitration Award

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The plaintiff successfully confirmed an arbitration award concerning certain franchise agreements and then sought attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with its confirmation action based on the attorneys’ fees provision in the franchise agreements. The defendants opposed because the arbitrator had already issued a final award awarding attorneys’ fees and costs in the arbitration.

The franchise agreement provided that if either party instituted arbitration and prevailed against the other party based entirely or in part on the terms of the franchise agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the losing party, in addition to any judgment, reasonable attorneys’ fees and arbitration costs. The magistrate judge found that, by its plain terms, the fee provision did not expressly authorize the court to award attorneys’ fees for enforcing an arbitration award.

Furthermore, where an arbitration award includes an award of attorneys’ fees – which it did here – a trial court may not award additional attorneys’ fees for enforcing or appealing the confirmation of the award unless the arbitration agreement provides otherwise.

Stockade Franchising, LP v. Kelly Rest. Grp., LLC, No. 1:18-cv-00918 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2019).

Fifth Circuit Affirms Confirmation of Arbitration Ruling in Favor of Ameriprise Financial

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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the confirmation of an arbitration ruling in favor of Ameriprise Financial Services Inc. In 2015, Ameriprise sought a temporary restraining order against Jeremy Walker, a former employee of an Ameriprise franchisee, to prevent him from using confidential customer information. The matter was referred to a FINRA arbitration panel, which resulted in an award against Walker and in favor of Ameriprise for injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and attorneys’ fees.

In 2017, Walker filed a FINRA arbitration against Ameriprise, primarily alleging that he was improperly enjoined by the 2015 arbitration. Ameriprise moved to dismiss under FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes Rule 13504(a)(6)(C), which provides that dismissal may be granted when the “non-moving party previously brought a claim regarding the same dispute against the same party that was fully and finally adjudicated on the merits and memorialized in an order, judgment, award, or decision.” The 2017 arbitration panel found the 2015 arbitration and award met the requirements of Rule 13504(a)(6)(C) and unanimously dismissed the arbitration. Walker filed a motion to vacate arguing that the 2017 panel was “guilty of misconduct” under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) and “exceeded its powers” under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). The district court disagreed, denied Walker’s motion to vacate, and granted Ameriprise’s motion to confirm.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Walker grounded his argument for vacatur under § 10(a)(3) upon the panel’s supposed failure to allow him to present evidence and testimony. However, the Fifth Circuit found that Walker was not prevented from presenting either. With regard to Walker’s argument that the panel exceeded its powers under § 10(a)(4), Walker argued that the panel erred in determining that the elements of Rule 13504(a)(6) had been met. However, this argument was insufficient under the § 10(a)(4) standard for vacatur, which requires a finding that the arbitration panel “acts contrary to express contractual provisions.” Even if Walker were correct that the panel had made a legal error, such errors “lie far outside the category of conduct embraced by § 10(a)(4).”

Walker v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 18-11641 (5th Cir. Oct. 9, 2019).

Court Confirms Arbitration Award Under FAA’s Strong Presumption in Favor of Such Awards

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This case arises from a dispute over the parties’ obligations under several oil and gas leases. The parties engaged in an arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement. The arbitration panel entered awards in favor of defendants Alan Larson and others. Northeast Natural Energy LLC filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, there is a strong presumption in favor of an arbitration award and a court must grant an order confirming an arbitration award, except in few enumerated instances. One ground for vacating an award includes “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” The court may also vacate an arbitration award when the arbitrators displayed a “manifest disregard” of the law. This means there must be “absolutely no support at all in the record justifying the arbitrator’s determinations.”

The court denied Northeast Energy’s motion to vacate the arbitration award and held that the panel did not exceed its powers and did not manifestly disregard the law. The court explained that there was nothing in the record to support that the panel exceeded its powers by rewriting the leases and failing to interpret the leases as written. The court further explained that the panel did not remove a provision from the leases, and the record supported the panel’s interpretation. The court found that the panel’s application of the parol evidence rule was not “completely irrational” as it cited appropriate legal authority and did not misapply Pennsylvania law. Lastly, the court held that the panel did not manifestly disregard the law in making awards to non-testifying defendants because the record revealed that the panel had sufficient information to make such findings.

Ne. Natural Energy LLC v. Larson, No. 3:18-cv-00240 (W.D. Penn. Sept. 20, 2019).