Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

SDNY Confirms Arbitration Order, Holding Order Was Final and Arbitrator Did Not Exceed Authority

December 3, 2024 by Kenneth Cesta

In Subway Franchise Systems of Canada ULC v. Subway Developments 2000 Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York addressed whether an arbitrator exceeded her authority when ordering that one of the parties to the arbitration must continue making interim payments during the pendency of the arbitration, and whether the arbitrator’s order was final and subject to appeal.

The underlying arbitration involved claims brought by Subway Developments 2000 Inc. against Subway Franchise Systems of Canada ULC alleging that Subway Franchise wrongfully terminated two development-agent agreements between the parties. The development-agent agreements included a mandatory arbitration provision that covered disputes regarding the termination of the agreements. The agreements further provided that any arbitration initiated under the agreements is limited to a determination by the arbitrator of the validity of the termination of the agreement by Subway Franchise, potential reinstatement of Subway Development if the termination is found to be invalid, and for a determination of damages. The agreements also included a provision requiring Subway Franchise to make 50% of the periodic payments due to Subway Development during the pendency of the arbitration until the arbitrator issued a decision. Subway Franchise initially took the position that it was excused from making the required payments but later made the payments either directly to Subway Developments or to Subway Franchise’s attorney trust account. Subway Developments objected and brought the matter to the arbitrator’s attention. After a hearing, the arbitrator issued an order requiring Subway Franchise to resume making the payments required under the development-agent agreements directly to Subway Developments during the pendency of the arbitration. Three months later, the arbitrator entered another order imposing sanctions if Subway Franchise failed to comply with the prior order and denying Subway Franchise’s motion to stay the order.

Subway Franchise then filed a petition in the district court seeking to vacate the arbitrator’s order, contending that the arbitrator exceeded her authority by compelling it to make interim payments directly to Subway Developments during the pendency of the arbitration. Subway Developments opposed the petition, arguing that the arbitrator’s order was not final and thus not subject to appeal, or in the alternative, to confirm the arbitrator’s order. In reviewing the petition, the court noted that the case is governed by the New York Convention since both parties to the proceeding maintained their principal place of business outside the United States and that the domestic provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) also applied since the arbitration was being conducted in the United States. The court then addressed whether the arbitrator’s order was final and subject to appeal, concluding that since the order “determines temporary control over the money that would be used to secure any potential judgment” the order is “final for the purpose of judicial review.” The court then addressed Subway Franchise’s petition to vacate the order under section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, which allows a party to seek to vacate an arbitration award when the arbitrator “exceeded her powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” After a thorough review of applicable case law and the record submitted, the court concluded that Subway Franchise “fails to meet the high standard to demonstrate that the arbitrator exceeded her authority here” and denied Subway Franchise’s petition to vacate the order. The court then addressed Subway Developments’ petition to confirm the arbitration order, concluding that it must confirm the arbitration order under the New York Convention since no grounds exist to vacate the award.

Subway Franchise Systems of Canada, ULC v. Subway Developments 2000, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-00593 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2024).

Vacation of Arbitration Award for Manifest Disregard of the Law Is “Exceedingly Rare,” Requires “Egregious Impropriety”

August 30, 2024 by Benjamin Stearns

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York denied a petition to vacate a $65 million arbitration award based on the petitioner’s argument that the arbitrator’s decision was in “manifest disregard of the law.” The court explained that a “litigant seeking to vacate an arbitration award based on alleged manifest disregard of the law bears a heavy burden, as awards are vacated on grounds of manifest disregard only in those exceedingly rare instances where some egregious impropriety on the part of the arbitrator is apparent.”

A court may vacate an award for manifest disregard of the law only if the court finds both that:

The arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether; and
The law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.

In contrast, a court must uphold an arbitration award so long as “the arbitrator has provided even a barely colorable justification for his or her interpretation of the contract.”

Here, the court found that the arbitrator’s award was “extensively reasoned” and “correctly applied New York law.” As such, the court granted the respondent’s cross-motion to confirm the arbitration award.

The court denied the respondent’s motion for attorneys’ fees, despite noting that it retained “inherent equitable powers to award attorney’s fees when the opposing counsel acts in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons,” and despite the fact that it dispatched the petitioner’s motion to vacate with relative ease. Although the petitioner’s arguments failed, the court did not find that counsel had acted “in bad faith … or for oppressive reasons.” The respondent argued that the petitioner’s motion breached clear provisions of the arbitration agreement prohibiting such filings, and it should therefore be awarded the fees it had been forced to expend. But the court noted that the agreement “effectively incorporated FAA review into [the] contract” and, further, that “courts have held provisions that prevent or discourage petitioners from challenging arbitral awards are unenforceable.”

Risen Energy Co. v. Focus Futura Holding Participações S.A., No. 1:23-cv-10993 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2024).

District Courts May Not “Look Through” Applications to Modify, Confirm, or Vacate Arbitral Awards

August 8, 2024 by Benjamin Stearns

Ascension Data & Analytics LLC terminated its contract with Pairprep Inc. for data extraction services after an alleged data breach involving Pairprep’s servers and Pairprep’s alleged “failure to extract reliable data.” Ascension subsequently initiated arbitration proceedings against Pairprep pursuant to the parties’ contract in an attempt to recover the remediation costs incurred as a result of Pairprep’s data breach. Pairprep asserted counterclaims against Ascension, and the arbitration panel ultimately rendered a monetary award in Pairprep’s favor.

Ascension petitioned the Northern District of Texas to vacate the arbitration award. Shortly thereafter, Pairprep filed an application to confirm the arbitration award in Texas state court. The state court confirmed the award and entered a final judgment in favor of Pairprep. In the federal proceeding, Ascension filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against the state court proceeding, while Pairprep argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The district court agreed and dismissed the matter due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Badgerow v. Walters. There, the Supreme Court concluded that district courts may not “look through” the application for confirmation or vacation of an arbitration award to determine whether the court has jurisdiction over the matter. Rather, “a court may look only to the application actually submitted to it in assessing its jurisdiction.”

The fact that a petition seeks enforcement or vacation of an arbitration award rendered under the Federal Arbitration Act is not sufficient. Rather, the court must identify some additional “independent basis for its jurisdiction,” such as satisfaction of the requirements for diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction. The court noted that an arbitration award “is no more than a contractual resolution of the parties’ dispute … [a]nd quarrels about legal settlements — even settlements of federal claims — typically involve only state law, like disagreements about other contracts.” As such, if there is no other additional basis for federal jurisdiction that is shown on the petition to modify, confirm, or vacate an arbitration award, then the matter is one for state courts, not federal courts.

Ascension Data & Analytics, LLC v. Pairprep, Inc., No. 23-11026 (5th Cir. June 25, 2024)

South Carolina Supreme Court Vacates Award, Finds Arbitration Panel Manifestly Disregarded Statutory Law

May 24, 2024 by Benjamin Stearns

National Golf Management LLC sold 13 golf courses to a buyer represented by broker Andrew Waldo. NGM was represented in a previous transaction by Michael Cousins. Although Cousins had no written representation agreement with any of the parties involved in the 13-golf course deal, he and his real estate brokerage company sued Waldo, Waldo’s company, and NGM, among others, for a commission from the sale of the golf courses.

As a result of both Waldo and Cousins’ membership in a local realtor association, they were required to arbitrate their professional dispute. Despite South Carolina statutes stating that oral agreements for a commission from a real estate transaction were unenforceable, the arbitration panel ruled that Cousins was entitled to half of the commission Waldo earned from the sale.

Waldo petitioned the circuit court, which vacated the award. However, the court of appeals reversed, finding that there was a “barely colorable” ground for the arbitration award based on a line of cases upholding oral and implied contracts for real estate commissions that, while in conflict with statutory law, had not been directly overruled.

The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed. While acknowledging and reaffirming the “rare and narrow basis” upon which courts may disturb an arbitration award, the court found that the circumstances of this case constituted just such a “rare” occasion. The court explained that subsequent to the issuance of the opinions cited by the appellate court, the South Carolina legislature had enacted laws that “fundamentally changed real-estate licensing.” Cousins argued that he was a “cooperating broker” or a “subagent” of Waldo and therefore was entitled to a share of the commission. However, the newly enacted laws, which were in effect at the time of the transaction in question, required a subagent agreement to “be in writing” and to “set forth all material terms of the parties’ agency relationship.”

The law went further and explicitly prohibited oral or implied agency relationships, providing that “[f]or all real estate transactions, no agency relationship … exists unless the buyer, seller … and the brokerage company … agree, in writing, to the agency relationship. No type of agency relationship may be assumed … or created orally or by implication.” The court found that the arbitrators were aware of these statutes but nevertheless ordered the commission to be shared with Cousins.

The court noted that courts “may now vacate an arbitration award, but only when it is untethered from controlling legal principles known to, but shrugged off by, the arbitrator…. As we have held, ‘manifest disregard is an exacting standard, but it is not insurmountable.’” In light of the above facts, the court found that the arbitration award was in manifest disregard of the law and vacated the award.

Waldo v. Cousins, No. 2022-000134 (S.C. May 1, 2024).

Second Circuit Affirms District Court Order Confirming Chinese Arbitration Award

May 10, 2024 by Kenneth Cesta

In Huzhou Chuangtai Rongyuan Investment Management Partnership v. Qin, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court order granting summary judgment confirming a Chinese arbitration award totaling approximately $450 million, rejecting Respondent/Appellant’s contention that he was not provided with adequate notice of the underlying arbitration.

The underlying arbitration involved a contract dispute between the original shareholders and subsequent investors in a Chinese company that owned and operated movie theaters. The petitioners initiated the arbitration before the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), alleging that the respondent breached a capital increase agreement. The petitioners were awarded approximately $450 million in connection with the arbitration, which was confirmed by the district court. The respondent then appealed, contending that he was not provided with adequate notice of the arbitration and was unable to participate in the selection of the arbitrators.

In affirming the district court’s order, the Second Circuit first confirmed its standard of review, noting that “we review legal issues de novo and findings of fact for clear error.” Citing the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the court recognized that lack of proper notice of the arbitration is a defense to enforcement under Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention. The court further noted, however, that the review of arbitral awards under the New York Convention is “very limited in order to avoid undermining the twin goals of arbitration … settling disputes efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation.” The court then rejected the respondent’s contention that he was not provided with adequate notice of the arbitration and was unable to participate in the selection of the arbitrators, finding that CIETAC’s efforts to provide notice to the respondent were “reasonably calculated to provide notice under the circumstances of this case,” thus satisfying due process. The court affirmed the district court’s orders granting the petitioners’ motion to confirmation the arbitration award and denying the respondent’s motion for reconsideration.

Huzhou Chuangtai Rongyuan Investment Management Partnership v. Qin, No. 23-0747 (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 2024).