Arbitration Process Issues

CALIFORNIA APPELLATE COURT UPHOLDS DELEGATION CLAUSE IN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

August 7, 2014 by Carlton Fields

The issue before the California Appellate Court was whether the trial court erred in enforcing a delegation clause in an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), and granting the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.

Plaintiff/Petitioner brought a wage and hour action against her former employer. The defendant former employer moved to compel arbitration, pursuant to a clause contained in its employee handbook. The delegation clause provided, “The arbitrator has exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, or enforceability of this binding arbitration agreement.” Plaintiff opposed arbitration asserting that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. Defendant, in turn, asserted that arbitration agreement contained a delegation clause providing that issues relating to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement were themselves delegated to the arbitrator for resolution. The dispute then turned to whether the delegation clause itself was unconscionable.

The appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision. The appellate court concluded a portion of the rationale underlying Murphy v. Check ‘N Go of California, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 138 (Murphy); Bruni v. Didion (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1272 (Bruni); and Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA), Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 494 (Ontiveros) was no longer viable under California law. Murphy, Bruni, and Ontiveros relied on three factors to conclude that the delegation clauses at issue were substantively unconscionable: (1) they were outside the reasonable expectations of the parties; (2) they were not bilateral; and (3) they provided for decisionmaking by arbitrators who would be biased by their financial self-interest. The appellate court found that the first two factors did not apply to the delegation clause at issue and that the third factor was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Malone v. Superior Court, B253891 (Cal. Ct. App. June 17, 2014).

This post written by Kelly A. Cruz-Brown.

See our disclaimer.

NEW YORK FEDERAL COURT RULES IT CANNOT COMPEL ARBITRATION IN GEORGIA

August 6, 2014 by Carlton Fields

A New York federal court recently was presented with a motion to compel arbitration in Georgia. The district court first concluded that the arbitration provision was enforceable and then proceeded to the question of whether it had the authority to compel arbitration in a district other than its own. The court described what it deemed an “internal conflict” within the Federal Arbitration Act because the Act provides both that (1) courts must enforce an arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms, and (2) arbitration must take place “within the district in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed.” The court also noted an unresolved split in the Second Circuit on how a New York district court should proceed when a suit pending before it involves an arbitration agreement that specifies that arbitration should take place outside the court’s district. Ultimately, the court ruled that it had no authority to compel arbitration outside its district, but nevertheless wished to enforce the valid forum selection clause contained in the agreement. Accordingly, the district court elected to stay the action, pending arbitration of the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant in Georgia. This approach left the parties free to pursue their contractual rights and remedies in the appropriate venue without running afoul of the FAA. Klein v. ATP Flight School, No. 14-CV-1522 (USDC E.D. N.Y. July 3, 2014).

This post written by Catherine Acree.

See our disclaimer.

NINTH CIRCUIT FINDS REVISIONS TO ARBITRATION POLICY IN EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK EFFECTIVE AND ENFORCEABLE

August 5, 2014 by Carlton Fields

The Ninth Circuit recently reversed a district court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration of an employee’s claims that were brought as a putative class action against her employer, Nordstrom. The basis for the motion to compel was an arbitration provision contained in Nordstrom’s employee handbook. The arbitration provision had been modified to preclude employees from bringing class action lawsuits after the employee received the handbook.

The employee argued that she did not have reasonable notice of the change based on a provision in the employee handbook that required Nordstrom to provide employees with 30 days written notice of any substantive changes to the arbitration provision. The handbook provided that the notice provision was included to “allow employees time to consider the changes and decide whether or not to continue employment subject to the changes.” To comply with the notice provision, Nordstrom sent letters to employees in June 2011 informing them of the change in the arbitration policy. Nordstrom did not seek to enforce the new arbitration provision during the 30-day notice period, but the letter was silent in that regard and stated that the revised arbitration provision was the “current version.” Applying California law, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Nordstrom had satisfied the minimal requirements for providing employees with reasonable notice of a change to its employee handbook by sending the letter to the employees informing them of the modification, and by not seeking to enforce the arbitration provision during the 30-day notice period. The Ninth Circuit also held that Nordstrom was not bound to inform the employee that her continued employment after receiving the letter constituted acceptance of new terms of employment. Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 12-17403 (9th Cir. June 23, 2014).

This post written by Catherine Acree.

See our disclaimer.

TEXAS SUPREME COURT VACATES $26 MILLION ARBITRATION AWARD AND REVERSES COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION IMPOSING REQUIREMENT FOR SELECTION OF ARBITRATORS

July 29, 2014 by Carlton Fields

Nearly ten years after arbitration proceedings commenced involving a claim arising from the purchase and sale of various insurance companies, the Texas Supreme Court vacated the $26 million arbitration award entered against Americo Life, Inc. et. al. (“Americo”) in favor of Robert L. Myer and Strider Marketing Group, Inc. (“Myer”) and reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment, finding that the arbitration panel exceeded its authority because the panel was formed contrary to the express terms of the arbitration agreement. The arbitration clause contained in the agreement between Americo and Myers provided for a tripartite arbitration, where each party appointed an arbitrator and the two arbitrators would select a third. Each arbitrator was to be a “knowledgeable, independent business person or professional.” The arbitration clause also provided that the arbitration proceedings “shall be conducted in accordance with the commercial arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). At the time the agreement was executed, AAA rules did not require arbitrator impartiality, but by the time the arbitration was invoked, AAA rules required by default that any arbitrator shall be “impartial and independent…”

The issue in this case centered around the AAA striking the arbitrator selected by Americo on the basis the arbitrator was not impartial. America moved to vacate the award and argued that in disqualifying the arbitrator, the AAA failed to follow the arbitrator-selection process specified in the parties’ agreement because the parties never agreed that the arbitrators must be “impartial.” The Texas Supreme Court agreed.

First, the Texas Supreme Court rejected Myer’s argument that the term “independent”, which was contained in the parties’ agreement, was the same as the term “impartial.” The Court then turned to the question of whether the incorporation by reference of the AAA Rules also incorporated the impartiality requirement even though the requirement did not exist at the time the agreement was signed. The Americo Court held the impartiality requirement was not incorporated because it conflicted with the terms of the parties’ agreement. The parties agreed to arbitrators who were “knowledgeable” and “independent,” but not impartial. Thus, because the AAA impartiality rules conflicted with the parties’ agreement, the agreement controls over the AAA rules. Therefore, the AAA should not have disqualified Americo’s arbitrator on the grounds of impartiality and the arbitration panel exceeded its authority, requiring that the award be vacated. Americo Life, Inc. v. Myer, No. 12-0739 (Texas June 20, 2014).

This post written by Leonor Lagomasino.

See our disclaimer.

COURT REFUSES TO COMPEL NONSIGNATORY TO JOIN REINSURANCE ARBITRATION

July 22, 2014 by Carlton Fields

On April 8, 2014, we reported on National Indemnity Company’s (“NICO”) attempt in a Nebraska federal district court to enjoin Transatlantic Reinsurance Company from commencing arbitration against NICO in Chicago and New York under various reinsurance agreements. Both arbitrations involved asbestos liability transferred to NICO, and separately reinsured by Transatlantic Re. The Nebraska court elected not to adjudicate NICO’s injunction claim, but instead decided to sever it into two, and transfer the resulting two claims to Illinois and New York.

The Illinois district court recently refused to compel arbitration against NICO, finding that NICO was a not a signatory to the underlying reinsurance agreement containing the arbitration agreement between Transatlantic Re and the cedent, Continental Insurance Company. The court also found that the language of the arbitration clause was not broad enough to include nonsignatories, and further found that NICO, by its conduct, never assumed the obligation to arbitrate. The court also interpreted the agreements between Continental and NICO and determined that the Transatlantic Re’s arbitration provisions were never incorporated in those agreements by reference. Finally, the court held that NICO was not estopped from disclaiming an obligation to arbitrate because it never asserted any rights of its own for its direct benefit under Transatlantic Re’s reinsurance agreement, notwithstanding the fact that NICO did derive certain indirect benefits. Transatlantic Reinsurance Co. v. National Indemnity Co., Case No. 1:14-cv-01535 (USDC N.D. Ill. June 24, 2014).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

See our disclaimer.