Arbitration Process Issues

CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL SIDES WITH FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT OVER STATE LAW UNCONSCIONABILITY RULE

February 17, 2015 by Carlton Fields

The California Court of Appeals recently held that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempts California’s Broughton-Cruz rule, which states that arbitration agreements for injunctive relief under California’s unfair competition and false advertising laws are against public policy and invalid.

In McGill v. Citibank, plaintiff sued Citibank for state law claims of unfair competition and false advertising, alleging that Citibank had violated her rights as a consumer in offering a credit insurance plan she purchased to protect her credit card account. Citibank moved to compel plaintiff to arbitrate her claims pursuant to the arbitration provision in her account contract. The trial court granted the motion with regard to plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages and restitution but refused to order arbitration of the claim for injunctive relief. Citibank appealed the decision as to the damages and restitution claims.

California’s appellate court held that the California Broughton-Cruz rule did not survive the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). In Concepcion, the Court held that the FAA preempts state laws, such as laws that prohibit class arbitration waivers in certain contexts or otherwise impede the FAA’s objective of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms. The California court reversed and remanded the case for the trial court to order all of plaintiff’s claims to arbitration. McGill v. Citibank, N.A., No. G049838 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2014).

This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.

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THIRD CIRCUIT REVERSES EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL RULING COMPELLING ARBITRATION AGAINST NON-SIGNATORY INSURER

February 16, 2015 by Carlton Fields

The trial court had granted the motion to compel arbitration of Flintkote Company against one of its asbestos liability insurers, Aviva PLC, despite the fact that Aviva was a non-signatory to the subject Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement (“ADR Agreement”). Flintkote had entered into the ADR Agreement with its other asbestos liability insurers, but not with Aviva, which would not accept the ADR Agreement’s arbitration provision. The trial court compelled arbitration based on equitable estoppel, reasoning that Aviva had agreed to participate in mediation with Flintkote and the other insurers (which had been initiated further to the ADR Agreement). On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed. The court held that there was “simply no evidence that Aviva embraced the [ADR] Agreement when it opted to participate in mediation alongside the other London insurers.” The court also ruled that certain correspondence sent by the joint mediation counsel that referenced the ADR Agreement or suggested joint action with Aviva did not constitute sufficient reliance on the ADR Agreement to compel Aviva to arbitrate. The court further held that Flintkote could not have reasonably relied on an “unspoken” agreement with Aviva to arbitrate, given that Aviva had previously “negotiated for and specifically reserved the right to resolve all disputed issues through litigation.” Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLC, No. 13-4055 (3d Cir. Oct. 9, 2014).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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SECOND CIRCUIT REFUSES TO EMPLOY THE ALL WRITS ACT TO ENJOIN A SECOND ARBITRATION OF THE SAME CLAIMS

February 11, 2015 by Carlton Fields

The Second Circuit recently affirmed a district court’s refusal to enjoin an arbitration proceeding under the All Writs Act. The parties to the dispute had been involved in a prior arbitration that resulted in an award confirmed by the district court. While the confirmation judgment was on appeal, one of the parties instituted a second arbitration raising claims similar to those asserted in the first arbitration. The respondent, Citigroup, Inc., filed suit in the Southern District of New York, arguing that the All Writs Act should be applied to enjoin the second arbitration because the second arbitration amounted to an “assault” on the prior federal judgment confirming the first award. The district court rejected Citigroup’s argument, dismissed the federal court action, and compelled arbitration. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the FAA’s framework favoring the submission of disputes to arbitration precludes use of the All Writs Act to enjoin a subsequent arbitration of claims that one party asserts are barred by the prior arbitration. In reaching this decision, the Second Circuit noted that the prior federal judgment did not involve consideration of the merits of the underlying claims, but rather merely confirmed an arbitration award through a limited review. The Second Circuit concluded that a federal court’s interest in protecting the integrity of such a prior judgment does not authorize use of the All Writs Act. Citigroup, Inc. v. Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth., No. 13-4825-CV, 2015 WL 161745 (2d Cir. Jan. 14, 2015).

This post written by Catherine Acree.

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NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS GRANTS WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO VACATE ORDER GRANTING DISQUALIFICATION OF ARBITRATOR

February 10, 2015 by Carlton Fields

In In Re Sussex, No. 14-70158 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 2015), the Ninth Circuit determined that the district court erred in holding that its decision to intervene mid-arbitration was justified under Aerojet-General Corp. v. Am Arbitration Ass’n, 478 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1973). Specifically, the panel held that the district court erred in predicting that an award issued by the arbitrator would likely be vacated because of his evident partiality under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2). The panel determined that undisclosed facts regarding the arbitrator’s efforts to start a company to attract investors for litigation financing did not give rise to a reasonable impression that the arbitrator would be impartial toward either party. The panel, quoting Commonwealth Coatings v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) emphasized that an arbitrator must disclose facts showing that they might be reasonably biased against one litigant and favorable to another. In this case, the panel found that the arbitrator’s financial effort regarding his efforts to start a litigation finance company in relation to the parties and issues in the case were contingent, attenuated, and speculative. Furthermore, the panel held that even if the arbitrator’s activities created a reasonable impression of partiality, the district court’s equitable concern that costs and delays would result if the arbitration award were vacated was inadequate to justify a mid-arbitration intervention, regardless of the size and early stage of arbitration.

This post written by Kelly A. Cruz-Brown.

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UTAH FEDERAL COURT STAYS PROCEEDINGS UNDER MILLER ACT PENDING ARBITRATION

February 5, 2015 by Carlton Fields

The core issue facing a federal court in Utah was whether it should stay the proceedings pending resolution of related arbitration proceedings involving sureties which issued payment bonds under the Miller Act. A dispute arose among various parties involved in the construction of a project called the Utah Data Center. Cache Valley Electric Company sued Truland Systems which subcontracted Cache to perform certain electrical work on the project. In accordance with the Miller Act, Truland, which had been subcontracted by the general contractor, obtained payment bonds for the labor and materials on the project. Cache sued to recover payment from the general contractor and from Truland’s sureties.

Truland’s sureties then moved to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding between the general contractor, Truland, and Cache, arguing that the outcome of the arbitration proceeding would determine whether Cache performed its contractual responsibilities. Cache opposed the stay on the grounds that the purpose of the Miller Act would be violated if arbitration is compelled because the purpose of the payment bond required under the Act is to shift the ultimate risk of nonpayment from workmen and suppliers to the surety. Staying the case, Cache argued, would violate the Act’s prompt payment requirement. The court rejected Cache’s argument and stayed the proceedings. Even though Truland’s sureties were not parties to the arbitration proceedings and not technically bound by the Truland/Cache arbitration agreement, the case should nevertheless be properly stayed. A stay of the case would promote judicial economy, would avoid inconsistent results, and would create undue hardship for Cache which had the opportunity to defend itself in the arbitration. United States ex. rel Cache Valley Electric Co. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America, Case No. 2:13-cv-01120-DN (USDC D. Utah Jan. 13, 2015).

This post written by Leonor Lagomasino.

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