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Arbitration Process Issues

THIRD CIRCUIT REAFFIRMS HIGH BURDEN TO ESTABLISH DELEGATION OF CLASS ARBITRABILITY DETERMINATION

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Earlier this month, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed its holding that the availability of class arbitration constitutes a question of arbitrability to be decided by courts unless the arbitration agreement “clearly and unmistakably” provides otherwise and expanded this holding to encompass situations in which the alleged delegation occurs through incorporation of American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules. The case arose out of a dispute regarding leases over oil and gas with landowners in Pennsylvania.

The lease agreements contained an arbitration provision that said that “all such disputes shall be determined by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the” AAA. The AAA rules included various subparts which, among other things, allow an arbitrator to determine if an arbitration should go forward on a class basis.  A lessee filed an arbitration demand with the AAA on behalf of itself and other similarly situated, and the lessor countered by filing a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that a court must determine class arbitrability and that the leases at issue did not allow for this.

The trial court granted summary judgment to the lessor and vacated the arbitrators’ decision regarding class arbitrability. The Third Circuit has set out a two part test to determine whether an arbitrator may determine class arbitrability: 1) does the agreement provide that class-wide arbitration is a question of arbitrability; and, if so 2) does the agreement clearly and unmistakably provide for the arbitrator to make this determination.  The Third Circuit has set this standard as an “onerous” one that simply could not be done in a case such as this where the agreement of the parties purported to incorporate rules which have various subparts, some of which allowed for an arbitrator to make this determination.  For this reason, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s determination. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, No. 15-1275 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 2016).

This post written by Zach Ludens.
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UBER’S ATTEMPT TO COMPEL CLASS ARBITRATION REJECTED DUE TO UNCONSCIONABILITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

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The court held that a number of the provisions in the subject arbitration agreements were unconscionable, including a delegation clause providing that disputes involving the arbitration agreement be decided in arbitration. The court found this clause to be, not only ambiguous in light of a conflicting class action court jurisdiction clause, but unconscionable as a contract of adhesion that, when combined with a fee splitting provision, unfairly required “the payment of hefty fees simply to arbitrate arbitrability.” The court further found unconscionable the clauses requiring the drivers to waive class claims under the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA), under Ninth Circuit precedent and California state case law. Because the court found that the arbitration agreement was “permeated with unconscionability,” it determined that it would not sever particular clauses, but would reject the arbitration agreement entirely. As a result, the court did not consider plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it violated the drivers’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act to file a class claim (as held by the NLRB in D.R. Horton). The court did appear to suggest, however, that such an argument would likely fail under the policies of the FAA as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Concepcion. O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. 13-cv-03826-EMC (USDC N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2015).

This post written by Joshua S. Wirth, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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FILING OF FOUR LAWSUITS OVER TEN YEARS DID NOT WAIVE RIGHT TO ARBITRATE WHERE “LITIGATION MACHINERY” HAD NOT BEEN INVOKED

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Grigsby & Associates appealed an order confirming an arbitration award of compensatory damages and attorney fees to M Securities, in a dispute relating to underwriting fees owed in a municipal bond transaction. Grigsby claimed that the award should be vacated because the defendants waived their right to arbitration after filing four lawsuits concerning the bond transaction over ten years. The Eleventh Circuit held, however, that despite the prior lawsuits, M Securities still had not “substantial[ly] invoke[d] the litigation machinery prior to demanding arbitration.” M Securities did not effectuate service against Grigsby in three of the lawsuits, and the fourth litigation did not progress beyond the filing stage. And while delay in seeking arbitration generally weighs in favor of finding waiver, it must be coupled with other substantial conduct “inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate,” which M Securities did not display here. Nor did Grigsby demonstrate prejudice given “the extremely limited nature” of the prior lawsuits. Grigsby & Associates, Inc. v. M Securities Investment, Case No. 13-15208 (11th Cir. Dec. 28, 2015).

This post written by Joshua S. Wirth, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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COURT DENIES RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER STAYING ACTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

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A federal district court refused to reconsider its order staying Allstate’s action to compel arbitration against its insured, A.O. Smith. The case involved a Settlement/Coverage-in Place Agreement between A.O. Smith and Allstate regarding coverage for asbestos liability. Continental Casualty Company, another insurer for A.O. Smith, filed an action in Wisconsin state court against both A.O. Smith and Allstate arguing that the Agreement impermissibly limited its subrogation and contribution rights against Allstate. When Allstate and A.O. Smith asserted their defenses in the Wisconsin action, a dispute emerged between them as to the nature of the Agreement. Allstate attempted to compel arbitration against A.O. Smith in federal court and to stay the Wisconsin litigation pending the outcome of the arbitration. The federal court, however, refused to compel arbitration and instead stayed its own proceedings, in deference to the Wisconsin court’s determination of a pending motion for summary judgment that could impact arbitrability. In denying reconsideration of that ruling, the court explained that its stay was warranted because the Wisconsin litigation was further along, the Wisconsin court was “currently in a more informed position from which to address the issue of arbitrability, and a stay [was therefore] warranted on that basis.” Allstate Insurance Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., Case No. 1:15-cv-06574 (USDC N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2015).

This post written by Barry Weissman.

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