Arbitration Process Issues

Tenth and Eleventh Circuits Buck Other Circuits Requiring Higher Showing of Intent to Delegate Class Arbitrability to Arbitrator

September 17, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

Within one week of each other, United States Courts of Appeals in two circuits have issued opinions holding that arbitration agreements incorporating the American Arbitration Association (AAA)’s arbitration rules itself demonstrates “clear and unmistakable” evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator, even when the arbitration involves class claims.

In Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Maizes, No. 17-14415 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2018), the Eleventh Circuit applied a prior case to mandate an arbitrator decide the arbitrability of a putative class dispute between members of Spirit Airlines’ so-called “$9 Fare Club” and the airline relating to allegedly broken promises related to the club membership. When the class representatives filed a class arbitration claim against Spirit, the airline sued the class representatives in federal court seeking a declaration that the agreement’s arbitration clause does not permit class arbitration claims. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The decision relied heavily upon a prior circuit decision—Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. P’ship—which held that parties’ choice of AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules constituted “clear and unmistakable” evidence they intended to submit the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Applying that reasoning to the present dispute, the court held the parties’ choice of AAA rules, including the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, demonstrated “clear and unmistakable” intent to delegate arbitrability.

In doing so the court rejected Spirit’s request for a higher burden where class arbitrability is concerned, as required in the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits. The court found those decisions did not align with its reading of Supreme Court precedent, distinguishing questions of whether an agreement allows class arbitration at all as separate and apart from the issue of who decides that question. Additionally, the court declined to read the arbitration clause’s reference to Florida law as creating ambiguity in the agreement, instead reading the clause to mean that Florida law governs the parties’ substantive rights while AAA rules govern arbitration procedures.

In DISH Network L.L.C. v. Ray, No. 17-1013 (10th Cir. Aug. 21, 2018), the Tenth Circuit applied circuit and Colorado law to conclude the question of class arbitrability rested with the arbitrator in a dispute between DISH Network and a former employee over alleged violations of federal and state employment laws and breach of contract. Originally filed as a putative class action in federal court, the former employee voluntarily dismissed his suit and re-filed the same claims in arbitration as a class action. The Tenth Circuit read the broad language in the parties’ arbitration agreement and the inclusion of AAA rules on employment disputes to display clear and unmistakable intent to arbitrate arbitrability. Like the Eleventh Circuit in Spirit Airlines, the court refused to follow other circuits and require more specific language delegating arbitrability when class arbitration is at issue. Because the court concluded that the parties “clearly and unmistakably” evinced intent to delegate the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator, it was able to sidestep the distinction of whether the arbitration clause permits class-wide arbitration is a gateway issue for courts to decide or a procedural issue for the arbitrator to decide.

The Tenth Circuit also rejected DISH’s petition to vacate based on its contention that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in concluding he was authorized to conduct class arbitration. It noted that the arbitrator conducted an in-depth analysis of the arbitration contract and the court’s review is extremely limited even where it may disagree with the arbitrator’s ultimate conclusion.

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

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Eleventh Circuit Reverses Sanction Imposed Against Party That Defaulted in Arbitration to Determine Whether Party Acted in Bad Faith

September 10, 2018 by Michael Wolgin

The Eleventh Circuit reversed a lower court’s entry of a default judgment against Acosta Tractors, Inc., that was based solely on Acosta’s default in the underlying arbitration. Julio Hernandez had filed a claim for unpaid wages against Acosta under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and Acosta compelled arbitration. However, the arbitration did not “proceed as planned,” as the arbitrator refused to consolidate Mr. Hernandez’s case with two similar actions and allowed “extensive discovery,” including 29 depositions, across the three separate arbitrations. Arbitration fees quickly added up to over $100,000, far exceeding the amount of the plaintiffs’ claims. Acosta refused to pay the arbitration fees and sought to return to the trial court. Instead, the trial court entered a default judgment against Acosta, based on its admission that it had refused to pay the costs of the arbitration and the lack of evidence establishing its inability to do so.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the trial court’s ruling. The Eleventh Circuit noted that it was within the lower court’s inherent power to enter a default judgment against Acosta, but held that it was error to do so “solely because a party defaulted in the underlying arbitration.” In order to impose a sanction against a party pursuant to its inherent power, the court “must make a finding that the sanctioned party acted with subjective bad faith.” The case was remanded to the District Court to determine whether the requisite bad faith existed. Hernandez v. Acosta Tractors, Inc., Case Nos. 17-13057; 17-13673 (11th Cir. August 8, 2018).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.

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Eighth Circuit Finds All Claims Involving Consumer Credit Dispute Subject to Arbitration

September 7, 2018 by John Pitblado

A federal court in Minnesota determined that three of Plaintiffs’ claims were not subject to the applicable arbitration clause: (1) state-law usury claims; (2) state and federal financial disclosure claims; and (3) state-law unjust enrichment counts. The Eighth Circuit reversed, directing the District Court to compel arbitration of all claims.

The Circuit Court first looked at whether the arbitration clause was broad or narrow, given that arbitration clauses which cover claims “arising out of” or “relating to” an agreement are treated broadly, so the clause at issue here, which contained both terms, was broad.

The Circuit Court then looked at whether “the underlying factual allegations simply touch matters covered by the arbitration provision.” Looking at the three claims, the Court found that “each claim implicates the credit offered or provided to the consumers because the facts underlying every claim overwhelmingly detail the financing relationship between the consumers and Bluestem.”

Lastly, the Circuit Court noted that the district court had “flipped the inquiry. The question is not whether there was a way to interpret the claims as falling outside the scope of the agreements; instead, where a valid arbitration agreement exists, the claims are arbitrable unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of any interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.”

Parm v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., No. 17-1931, 17-1932 (8th Cir. Aug. 7, 2018)

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

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Court Finds That Apparently Inconsistent Forum Selection Provisions Do Not Render Arbitration Agreement Unenforceable

August 7, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

Plaintiff Fintech Fund, FLP filed an action in federal court in the Southern District of Texas asserting claims under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act against Ralph Horne, a citizen of the United Kingdom and CEO of a company to which Fintech had licensed certain financial technology. Fintech claimed that Horne used that relationship to access Fintech’s confidential and proprietary information illegally. Horne moved to dismiss the action (1) for lack of personal jurisdiction and (2) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and improper venue because the matter was subject to an arbitration agreement.

The court rejected Horne’s personal and subject matter jurisdiction arguments, finding that the court had specific jurisdiction over him based on telephone calls he made and emails he sent as part of his allegedly wrongful conduct to a Fintech partner in Texas, and that it had subject matter jurisdiction because Fintech’s claims were for federal statutory violations. Fintech was less successful on the question of venue, however.

Fintech argued that the dispute was not arbitrable because the arbitration agreement was unenforceable and the claims at issue were not covered by it. Fintech said there was no meeting of the minds as to arbitration, as the relevant contract contained an irreconcilable internal inconsistency; the arbitration provision said that all claims against Horne and his company would be resolved by “arbitration under the London Court of International Arbitration (‘LCIA’) Rules,” while a choice of law provision in the same contract said that the courts of England and Wales would have exclusive jurisdiction over such claims. The court found that this apparent inconsistency could be resolved by interpreting them to require that any non-arbitrable claims and disputes regarding arbitrability be brought before courts in England or Wales, while any arbitrable claims must be submitted for arbitration in London. In either case, the agreed upon forum was in the United Kingdom, not the Southern District of Texas. Finding no justification for refusing to enforce the parties agreed upon forum, the court dismissed the action, leaving the question of arbitrability to be decided, if necessary, by a court in England or Wales. Fintech filed its notice of appeal on the same day that the district court entered its order.

Fintech Fund, FLP v. Horne, Civil Action No. H-18-1125 (S.D. Tex. July 6, 2018)

This post written by Jason Brost.

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Eleventh Circuit Reverses NLRB Order, Enforcing Individualized Arbitration Clause in Employee Agreement

August 1, 2018 by Michael Wolgin

A pizza delivery driver employed by Domino’s Pizza franchisee Cowabunga Inc. filed a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act with the National Labor Relations Board. Cowabunga moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, to stay and compel arbitration based on the employment agreement’s individualized arbitration clause. The day before he dismissed his FLSA lawsuit, the employee filed an unfair labor charge with the NLRB, alleging that Cowabunga violated the National Labor Relations Act by (1) prohibiting Cowabunga employees from filing collective action lawsuits and instead forcing the employees to individually arbitrate such claims, and (2) causing Cowabunga employees to reasonably believe that they were prohibited from filing unfair labor charges with the NLRB. The NLRB granted summary judgment to the employee on both claims.

Cowabunga petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review of the NLRB panel’s order. With regard to the employee’s first claim, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis which held that individualized arbitration agreements do not violate the NLRA and that those agreements should be enforced as written pursuant to the FAA. With regard to the second claim, the court explained that after the NLRB panel issued its order, it refashioned its test for determining whether an employer’s allegedly facially neutral policy, such as the arbitration provision here, would reasonably lead an employee to believe that he could not file an unfair labor charge with the NLRB. The Court therefore granted Cowabunga’s petition for review and reversed the NLRB panel’s order as to the employee’s first claim and vacated and remanded the order as to the second claim. Cowabunga, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., Case No. 16-10932 (11th Cir. June 26, 2018).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

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