Arbitration Process Issues

Homestead Insurance Company (“Homestead”) entered into a reinsurance contract with Interstate Guaranty Insurance Company (“Interstate”). Under applicable Georgia insurance regulations, Interstate was required to place funds in a trust for Homestead’s benefit to protect Homestead in case Interstate became insolvent. Thereafter, Homestead, Interstate and Wachovia Bank entered into a trust agreement, with Wachovia serving as Trustee. The trust agreement contained provisions incorporating it into the reinsurance contract. The reinsurance contract contained an arbitration clause mandating arbitration as a condition precedent to a lawsuit where disputes arose concerning either “the interpretation of [the reinsurance] Agreement” or the “rights of either party” thereunder.

After dispute arose between Homestead and Wachovia pertaining to Wachovia’s conduct as Trustee, Homestead filed an action in New Jersey state court (which was ultimately removed and transferred to Georgia federal court) to compel Wachovia to arbitration as required under the reinsurance contract. Wachovia argued that it was not a party to the reinsurance contract, and thus was not bound by the provision mandating arbitration. However, the court agreed with Homestead, citing terms of the trust agreement that indicated the parties’ intent to incorporate it in its entirety into the reinsurance contract, and finding that the Trust Agreement incorporated by reference the arbitration clause of the Reinsurance Agreement. The court found that the interpretation of the Trust Agreement came within the scope of arbitrable issues. After the court denied Wachovia’s motion to reconsider, Homestead dismissed the case with prejudice. Homestead Insurance Company v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., Case No. 07-2821 (USDC N.D. Ga. 2008).

This post written by John Pitblado.

Petitioners, Insurance Co. of North America and INA Reinsurance (collectively “INA”), and Respondent, Public Service Mutual Insurance Co. (“PSMIC”), came before the Southern District of New York on the question of whether an arbitration proceeding halted in medias res upon resignation of one party-appointed panelist may continue or whether under such circumstances the arbitration must commence anew. Under the terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement, each party was to choose their own arbitrator and then together select a third arbitrator to comprise a three person panel. After the arbitration had commenced and the panel had issued a Summary Judgment Order, one of the arbitrators was forced to withdraw for health considerations. PSMIC demanded that INA appoint a replacement arbitrator; INA demanded the arbitration commence anew. This case followed.

As a general rule, under Marine Products v. MT Globe Galaxy, 977 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1992) if a member of a three person arbitration panel dies before the rendering of an award, and the arbitration agreement does not anticipate that circumstance, the arbitration must commence anew with a new panel. The arbitration does not have to start over, however, if the panel has issued a “partial final award” and “was without power to revisit that question.” Here, the court determined that the original arbitration panel’s Summary Judgment Order did not “conclusively decide every point” and instead only rule on the applicability and effect of case law on INA’s primary defense. The court noted that the Summary Judgment Order was an interim decision on a matter of law and did not conclusively deal with all aspects of the case, including liability and damages. Further, the court determined that since the arbitration was fairly straightforward and not, as in Zeiler v. Deitsch, 931 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2007), “ongoing and complex arbitration.” As a result, the partial final award exception did not apply, and the court ordered arbitration to commence anew, with each party appointing its own arbitrators. The court further denied PSMIC’s motion to confirm the original panel’s Summary Judgment Order because the order did not “finally dispose of a separate, independent claim.” Ins. Co. of North Am. v. Public Service Mutual Ins. Co., Case No. 08-7003 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2008).

This post written by John Black.

On behalf of an aggrieved union member, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers brought a grievance against Verizon for declaring the employee medically unfit to drive a company van. A collective bargaining agreement provided for mandatory arbitration for all disputes under the agreement. Verizon alleged in arbitration that the dispute fell under the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act (“FMCSA”) rather than the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The arbitrator issued an Interim Award ordering the parties to submit to FMCSA dispute procedures before continuing arbitration. The American Arbitration Association cancelled an arbitration hearing and has since administratively closed the parties file. The FMCSA review process remains ongoing.

IBEW subsequently filed suit in the US District Court, alleging that Verizon’s failure to reschedule an arbitration hearing was in breach of the Collective Bargaining Agreement’s arbitration clause. IBEW moved for summary judgment on whether the underlying issue was arbitrable and whether Verizon was in violation of the arbitration agreement. The Court held that the crux of the matter was whether Verizon acted capriciously or arbitrarily when it found the employee medically unqualified to operate the motor vehicle, which would be a violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Disputes under the Agreement are subject to arbitration. The Court also stated that because the arbitrator ordered the parties to submit to FMCSA procedures, arbitration was in fact still ongoing. The Court noted that arbitrators naturally were empowered to consider federal law in making their rulings so the arbitrators’ order to submit to FMCSA procedures was not in error. Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Verizon North, Inc., Case No. 07-3194 (USDC C.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2008).

This post written by John Black.