Arbitration Process Issues

Court Finds Panel Did Not Manifestly Disregard Law When It Entered FINRA Award in Favor of Investment Firm and Advisors in Dispute over Fraud Committed by Late NFL Player’s Agent

June 13, 2019 by Michael Wolgin

The widow of a former NFL football player sued the player’s sports agent and financial adviser, alleging that the former player was defrauded by the agent in connection with the loss of the proceeds of the player’s life insurance policy. The plaintiff alleged that upon the player’s death, the insurance proceeds were paid to a trust, for which the agent acted as trustee without authorization. The funds were depleted by the agent, and the plaintiff asserted claims of breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and fraud against the agent and the agent’s investment firm and financial advisors.

The matter went to FINRA arbitration, and the panel concluded that the investment firm and the financial advisors were not legally responsible for the harm. The plaintiff moved to vacate the award on the ground that the panel manifestly disregarded the law when it reached the conclusion that “the Investment Firm and Investment Advisors were not required to conduct any investigation into the obviously suspicious and fraudulent behavior.” The firm and advisors moved to confirm the award, arguing that the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the award was untimely beyond the three-month limitation period. They relied upon the early issuance of the award, which contained two out of three signatures of the panel. The plaintiff relied upon a later date on which the third signature on the award was issued.

The court avoided ruling on the issue of timeliness, noting that some case law did support raising grounds for vacatur as a defense to a motion to confirm, even after the limitations period has expired. Turning to whether the panel manifestly disregarded the law, the court explained that, assuming “manifest disregard” is even a valid ground for vacatur in the Fifth Circuit, the panel did not disregard the existence of a clearly governing legal principle. The panel determined that “the Trustee of the trust was the person solely responsible for the asset destruction of the trust” and that the plaintiff failed to present any breach of a fiduciary duty “under any law or regulation.” The court concluded that “the Panel considered the existence of governing law, but found that a fiduciary duty did not exist under this law. Plaintiff’s issue with the arbitration decision is not that the Panel ignored the law entirely, but that the Panel did not reach Plaintiff’s desired outcome when applying the law. Therefore, even under the ‘manifest disregard of the law’ standard, Plaintiff’s motion for vacatur fails.” The court therefore denied the motion to vacate and confirmed the award.

Warren v. Geller, No. 2:11-cv-02282 (E.D. La. May 3, 2019).

Southern District Confirms Arbitration Award Over Challenge Based on Failure of Arbitrators to Disclose Information

June 6, 2019 by Brendan Gooley

The Southern District of New York has rejected a petition to vacate an arbitration award on the basis that the arbitrators failed to disclose allegedly material information.

Michael Miller worked as a financial advisor in a UBS branch. UBS gave Miller six loans, and Miller agreed any disputes regarding the loans could be arbitrated. A dispute regarding the loans arose after Miller left his job. Miller and UBS selected arbitrators in accordance with FINRA’s rules. The arbitrators ruled in favor of UBS. Miller unsuccessfully sought to vacate their award in the Southern District.

In his effort to vacate the award, Miller claimed the arbitrators failed to disclose pertinent information during the selection process resulting in the award (1) exceeding the arbitrators’ powers; and (2) an award that was the result of partiality or corruption in violation of FINRA’s rules. Specifically, Miller claimed one arbitrator (Teveris) failed to disclose she had represented an investor before FINRA in an unrelated matter in her initial disclosure and failed to sufficiently disclose the representation in her oath. He also claimed that another arbitrator (Rolnick) failed to disclose he was a defendant in an unrelated federal lawsuit. But Miller failed to explain how such information prevented the arbitrators from being objective. The court also rejected Miller’s argument that the information was material and would have affected how he ranked the arbitrators. That was not the standard, and the usefulness of the information was irrelevant, the court explained.

Miller also argued Rolnick had a potential interest in UBS securities that he failed to fully explain after he answered “yes” to a question asking if he or an immediate family member invested in or held securities that were the subject of the arbitration. While interest in UBS was a potential problem, it was disclosed and Miller was therefore on notice of a fact potentially indicative of bias. The applicable rules did not clearly require additional disclosures, and Miller failed to object to the allegedly incomplete disclosure, thereby waiving any right to challenge it. Moreover, Miller had been expressly told that he could object to the arbitrators after he was informed about the potential conflict.

If you don’t act as soon as practical on your right to challenge arbitrators based on information you know (or should know) about them, don’t expect to be able to vacate the award later.

Miller v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., No. 1:18-cv-08415 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2019)

Court Finds Arbitration Panel Did Not Exceed Powers or Manifestly Disregard the Law in Confirming Award in Dispute Over Leasing of Oil Lands

May 22, 2019 by Michael Wolgin

The case relates to an arbitration award entered in a dispute between affiliated oil exploration and marketing companies, on the one hand, and owners of land leased to the oil companies, on the other hand. The leases at issue authorized the exploration company to produce and sell any oil and natural gas found there. In exchange, the owners of the land would receive royalties calculated as a percentage of the proceeds attributable to the production from each well. The owners objected to the amount of the royalties paid by the exploration company, which were calculated based on the exploration company’s sales of the oil and gas to its affiliated marketing company, instead of based on the higher amounts for which the marketing company would sell the oil and gas downstream to third parties. The dispute went to an arbitration, which found that the owners failed to provide evidence that the oil sales between the affiliated companies were less than what would occur in an arms-length transaction. The panel found that the exploration company had legitimately transferred title to the oil and gas, and received sufficient consideration from the affiliated marketing company.

The owners petitioned the court to vacate the award, arguing that the arbitrators “exceeded their powers” and “effectively dispensed their own brand of industrial justice,” and that they “manifestly disregarded the law.” The court rejected both arguments, disagreeing that the arbitrators “ignored the central question” in dispute. According to the court, the panel found that (1) title was transferred to the marketing company; (2) the exploration company marketed the oil and gas as required; (3) the exploration company made “legally sufficient accounting entries on their books and records to evidence transfer of title and consideration paid for the oil and gas”; (4) the leases permitted the exploration company to sell to an affiliate; and (5) the owners failed to provide evidence of any defects with the sales transactions. The court found, without expressing any opinion about whether the panel was correct, that the panel “stayed well within its powers to adjudicate the dispute and executed those powers appropriately.” The court further found that the panel did not manifestly disregard the law. The court explained that the panel “was asked to interpret contracts that were arguably inconsistent both internally and with one another, and it made an informed, careful judgment about how to do so.” The court therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the oil companies and confirmed the award in its entirety.

Hale v. Chesapeake Expl., LLC, No. 4:18-cv-02217 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2019).

New York Court Discusses Qualifying and Disqualifying Conditions for Umpires

May 15, 2019 by Brendan Gooley

A New York Supreme Court recently explained the conditions that qualify and disqualify a proposed umpire. National Union Fire Insurance and Enstar could not agree on an umpire for their asbestos-claim-related arbitration. Each felt the umpires proposed by the other’s arbitrator should be disqualified. They invoked a procedure allowing the court to select the umpire.

The court explained that umpires must be “impartial such that his/her decision will be based upon the merits of the dispute rather than the personal influence or identity of the disputants.” Applying that general standard, the court struck one proposed umpire (Chaplin) on the ground that he had previously testified for Enstar in another arbitration on an issue material to the present arbitration and was therefore “not entirely neutral as to this arbitration.” The court noted, however, that prior service as an expert is not always an automatic disqualification. The court then struck another proposed umpire (Maneval) because he had voted against Chaplin’s interpretation in a prior arbitration. The court explained that his service as an umpire in the instant arbitration could therefore create “an appearance of possible bias.” Another proposed umpire (Stern) was previously adverse to National Union’s arbitrator and, while not necessarily a problem, there was no reason to put that arbitrator in such an “untenable position” when there were other qualified candidates. Those candidates did not include an arbitrator (Gurevitz) who had previously worked for National Union’s counsel, which warranted disqualification, and another arbitrator (White) who was not a lawyer and who was therefore not ideal given the legal nature of the issues in the forthcoming arbitration. The court determined that another arbitrator (Bickford) with substantial industry experience was best suited to serve in this dispute.

Enstar EU Ltd. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, No 654089/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 19, 2019).

Tenth Circuit Finds No Jurisdiction to Hear Appeal of District Court Stay Order While Motion to Compel Arbitration Is Pending in Parallel Federal Court Proceeding

May 10, 2019 by Alex Silverman

The plaintiff sued the defendants (collectively, DAL) in Colorado federal court after they denied his application for a Subway restaurant franchise. Because an arbitration clause in the franchise application required that any arbitration be held in Connecticut, DAL filed a motion to compel arbitration in Connecticut federal court. All proceedings in Colorado were stayed pending that motion. After DAL’s motion was denied, DAL appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. That appeal is currently pending. Meanwhile, the plaintiff asked the Colorado court to dissolve the stay and resume proceedings. The plaintiff lost that motion and appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. DAL moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

The Tenth Circuit granted DAL’s motion, agreeing that the stay order issued in Colorado did not “end the litigation,” and thus was not a “final decision” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. While there is an exception for stay orders that effectively put a party out of federal court, the exception was deemed inapplicable here, where one federal court deferred decisional authority to another federal court — the Second Circuit. The court also held that the stay order did not fall within the “small class” of collateral rulings that may be treated as “final” for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. It rejected the plaintiff’s contention that delaying review here until the entry of a final judgment “would imperil a substantial public interest” or “some particular value of a high order.”

Alemayehu v. Gemignani, No. 18-1340 (10th Cir. Apr. 17, 2019)