Rob DiUbaldo

Second Circuit Joins Sister Circuits in Holding Party-Appointed Arbitrators Not Subject to Same Disclosure Requirements as Neutral Arbitrators

July 17, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

The Second Circuit recently held that parties seeking to vacate awards under Federal Arbitration Act Section 10(a)(2) must satisfy a higher burden in showing evident partiality by a party-appointed arbitrator. The parties arbitrated a workers compensation reinsurance dispute and the losing party (Lloyds) moved to vacate the ultimate arbitral award on the ground that the prevailing party (ICA)’s selected arbitrator displayed evident partiality by failing to fully disclose his connections to ICA. The lower court vacated the award, finding that ICA’s appointed arbitrator’s undisclosed relationships were “more significant, more numerous, and involve[d] more financial entanglements” than would be acceptable, particularly in light of the “apparent willfulness” of the non-disclosure.

On appeal, the Second Circuit addressed as an issue of first impression what the appropriate standard is for a Section 10(a)(2) evident partiality challenge to a party-appointed arbitrator. The court disagreed with the lower court and instead followed the approach of other circuits in distinguishing between a heightened burden standard for party-appointed arbitrators and a reasonable person standard for neutral arbitrators. Despite the heightened burden, party-appointed arbitrators are subject to certain “baseline limits to partiality.” First, undisclosed relationships are material—and therefore warrant vacatur—if they violate the arbitration agreement. Here, the court noted, the only limitation in the arbitration agreement was that arbitrators be “disinterested,” in terms of financial and personal stake in the outcome. Second, undisclosed relationships are material if the complaining party can demonstrate the partiality had a prejudicial effect on the award.

As a result of this new framework, the Second Circuit remanded to the trial court to determine whether ICA’s arbitrator’s undisclosed relationships betrayed his disinterest or had a prejudicial effect on the arbitral award.

Certain Underwriting Members of Lloyds of London v. Ins. Co. of Am., No. 17-1137 (2d Cir. June 7, 2018).

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

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NAIC Publishes Exposure Drafts of Proposed Revisions to Credit for Reinsurance Models to Implement the Covered Agreement

July 16, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

The NAIC has published proposed revisions to the Credit for Reinsurance Model Law and the Credit for Reinsurance Model Regulation that are intended to facilitate compliance by the states with the provisions of the Covered Agreement with the European Union, and avoid the federal preemption of state credit for reinsurance laws. These exposure drafts further the implementation of the Covered Agreement discussed at the NAIC’s February 20, 2018 public hearing. The draft revisions add new sections to both the Model Act and the Model Regulation allowing a ceding insurer to take financial statement credit for reinsurance if the assuming insurer has its headquarters or domicile in what the state insurance commissioner determines is a “Reciprocal Jurisdiction,” as that term is defined in the revised Models. The proposed revisions do not change or delete any of the existing provisions of the Models, which would remain in force and effect along with the new provisions.

The proposed revised Model Regulation adds detailed requirements to the more general provisions of the Model Act, including provisions clearly intended to implement the provisions of Articles 3 – 5 of the Covered Agreement and extend the benefits of the reinsurance collateral provisions of the Covered Agreement to non-E.U. jurisdictions that have group governance, capital, supervision, solvency, and other requirements that are in compliance with those found in the Covered Agreement. For example, Section 9 of the proposed revised Model Regulation states that to be recognized by a state as a Reciprocal Jurisdiction, a non-U.S. jurisdiction must either: (1) be recognized by the state insurance commissioner as a Reciprocal Jurisdiction and be party to a treaty or international agreement with the United States regarding credit for reinsurance, such as a Dodd-Frank Act Covered Agreement; or (2) be recognized by the state insurance commissioner as a qualified jurisdiction and a Reciprocal Jurisdiction, meeting stated requirements concerning the equal treatment of insurers domiciled in the U.S. and the foreign jurisdiction, a lack of a “local presence” requirement, certain worldwide group governance, solvency, capital, and supervision requirements, and required information exchange and sharing between insurance supervisors. The proposed revisions impose requirements for credit for reinsurance in such jurisdictions that are not only consistent with but quoted from the Covered Agreement, effectively offering the terms of the Covered Agreement to countries outside the E.U. on an equal footing with the Covered Agreement’s terms for E.U. member nations. Section 9.B.(2)(d) of the proposed revisions to the Model Regulation notes that “a memorandum of understanding or similar document between the commissioner and such qualified jurisdiction” will be needed to implement the provisions concerning the exchange of information between the regulators of different jurisdictions.

The proposed revisions to the Models resolve two issues which were undecided at the February 2018 public hearing: (1) whether the reinsurance collateral reform contemplated by the Covered Agreement would be limited to U.S.-E.U. relationships, or be applicable to reinsurance arrangements with foreign reinsurers domiciled elsewhere; and (2) whether non-E.U. domiciled reinsurers would have to be subject to the group supervision, solvency, capital, and information exchange provisions of the Covered Agreement to receive the benefits of reinsurance collateral reform. The proposed revisions to the Models make the reinsurance collateral reform provisions available with respect to any reinsurer domiciled in what the state insurance commissioner determines is a Reciprocal Jurisdiction, not limiting such treatment to E.U. nations, but conditions a determination that a jurisdiction is a Reciprocal Jurisdiction on that jurisdiction having laws or regulations in place that are consistent with the group supervision, solvency, capital, and information exchange provisions of the Covered Agreement. Thus, the Covered Agreement potentially becomes a model for the worldwide reinsurance market for U.S. ceding insurers.

There is a short public comment period for these drafts open until July 23, 2018. The consideration of these proposed revisions presumably will continue on the schedule published by the NAIC earlier this year, with consideration by the Financial Condition (E) Committee at the NAIC’s August meeting and by the NAIC plenary at the November meeting.

This post written by Rollie Goss.
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Appellate Court of Massachusetts Finds That Reinsurer Must Pay Workers’ Compensation Benefits of Bankrupt Self-Insured Employer

June 28, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

In a recent opinion, a Massachusetts appeals court was required to determine who is liable to pay workers’ compensation benefits owed by a self-insured employer that has gone bankrupt? In a choice between the state created Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund and a reinsurer of that bankrupt employer, the court chose the reinsurer.

The case involved benefits due to Robert Janocha, whose employer at the time of his injury was self-insured for workers’ compensation claims. In compliance with Massachusetts law, the employer had ensured its ability to pay such claims with a $2.4 million surety bond and a reinsurance contract with ACE American Insurance Company, which had a $400,000 retention provision applicable to each injured employee. In 2007, the employer went bankrupt, and in 2012 the surety bond was exhausted. However, Mr. Janocha’s benefits had not reached the $400,000 retention floor, and ACE argued that, until that floor was reached, his benefits were the responsibility of the Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund under a statute requiring the Trust Fund to pay benefits for claims against employers “uninsured in violation” of the law. The court found that this statute only applied when the employer was uninsured at the time of the injury in question, however, and did not apply when the lack of insurance was the result of bankruptcy. Thus, the Trust Fund was not obliged to pay the benefits. The court then found that ACE was statutorily required to pay benefits in the event the self-insured employer became insolvent, and that the retention provision would not be enforced because “a party is unable to contract away its statutory obligations.” Thus, ACE was required to pay Mr. Janocha’s benefits.

Janocha’s Case, No. 16-P-1181 (Mass. App. Ct. May 2, 2018)

This post written by Jason Brost.

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Court Rejects Defendant’s Objections to Subpoenas as Untimely and Baseless in Fraudulent Transfer Default Judgment Spat

June 27, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

In a dispute previously reported on this blog, the Southern District of California overruled a defendant’s objections to subpoenas served on a former expert witness in defendant’s unrelated divorce case and to a bank for account information for a non-party corporate entity.

Regarding the former expert’s subpoenas, the court held that defendant waived her challenges. Plaintiff had served the subpoenas duces tecum to the defendant’s former expert witness in February 2018, with which the witness complied and produced hundreds of thousands of documents in March 2018. Defendant filed her objections in April 2018.

First, the court noted the difference under the Federal Rules between objections permitted by the non-party subject of the subpoena and motions to quash by parties who are not the subject of the subpoena. The defendant was not the subject of the subpoenas and thus could move to quash the subpoena. However, even interpreting defendant’s objections as a motion to quash, the court held they were untimely because they were filed a month after the subpoenas’ compliance date and the date on which the subject produced the documents. Additionally, the court held that even if defendant was technically able to object to the subpoenas, such objections were untimely filed after the statutory 14-day objection period.

The court next found there were no unusual circumstances or good cause to justify the untimeliness of defendant’s objections. Although defendant asserted a work product privilege regarding her former expert’s documents, that privilege was waived because the former expert was a testifying expert in her divorce case whose work is not protected by the privilege (compared to a consulting expert’s work). Defendant also failed to provide any explanation for her significant delay in filing objections.

Lastly, the court concluded that defendant lacked standing to quash a third-party subpoena for the former expert’s deposition testimony. Because it had already rejected defendant’s privilege claim, it found only the non-party witness could move to quash the subpoena prior to the deposition and defendant thus lacked standing to challenge the deposition.

Regarding the bank subpoena, the court overruled defendant’s objection to the subpoena pertaining to the non-party corporate entity’s account on relevance grounds. Although the corporate entity was an “uninvolved corporation,” newly-discovered emails indicated defendant created the corporate entity specifically to shield money from judgment creditors, making them highly relevant.

Odyssey Reinsurance Co. v. Nagby, Case No. 16-3038 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2018).

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

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Eleventh Circuit Finds Defendant Can’t Use Unsigned Consent to Receive Text Messages to Compel Arbitration Of TCPA Claim

June 26, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

Hope Gamble sued New England Auto Finance, Inc. (NEAF) in federal court under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Ms. Gamble alleged that NEAF, from which she had previously borrowed money to buy a car, sent her text messages without her consent. NEAF moved to compel arbitration under an arbitration agreement contained within her loan agreement. That loan agreement also contained a Text Consent Provision that would have granted NEAF the right to send Ms. Gamble text messages, but this provision required a separate signature, and Ms. Gamble did not sign it. The district court found that the TCPA claim was not covered by the arbitration agreement and denied NEAF’s motion.

On appeal, the NEAF argued that the arbitration agreement, which required arbitration of any “claim, dispute or controversy . . . whether preexisting, present or future, that in any way arises from or relates to this Agreement or the Motor Vehicle securing this Agreement,” was broad enough to encompass the TCPA claim. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, however, as the text messages in question did not involve her auto loan, which Ms. Gamble had paid off before the relevant text messages were sent. The NEAF further argued that the Text Consent Provision governed the issue of Ms. Gamble’s consent to receive text messages, even though she had not signed that provision. Again, the Court disagreed, finding that Ms. Gamble’s right not to receive text messages was created by Congress through the TCPA, not by any agreement with NEAF, and certainly not by the unsigned Text Consent Provision that, because it was unsigned, created no rights or obligations for anyone. Thus, the Court affirmed the denial of NEAF’s motion to compel arbitration.

Gamble v. New England Auto Finance, Inc., No. 17-15343 (11th Cir. May 31, 2018)

This post written by Jason Brost.

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