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Rob DiUbaldo

Alaska Follows Other States in Adopting Law Based on Updates to NAIC Credit for Reinsurance Model Law

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On July 13, 2018 Alaska became the last state to incorporate amendments to the NAIC Credit for Reinsurance Model Law into its insurance code when Governor Bill Walker (I) signed House Bill 401 into law. As explained by the state Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development’s legislative analysis, the bill allows domestic ceding insurers to receive credit for reinsurance either as an asset or liability deduction based on the reinsured ceded so long as the assuming insurer satisfies certain requirements. The requirements provide alternate ways to qualify ceding insurers to receive such credit, including when the assuming insurers: are licensed to transact insurance or reinsurance business in Alaska; are accredited as reinsurers; are domiciled in states accredited by the NAIC; maintain trust funds in qualified U.S. financial institutions and satisfy related requirements; are certified as reinsurers in Alaska and secure obligations subject to additional requirements; and more. Furthermore, the law implements principle based reserving for policies and contracts issued on or after the valuation manual’s operative date. Pursuant to Alaska law the bill took effect immediately upon the Governor’s signature.

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

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Court Finds That Apparently Inconsistent Forum Selection Provisions Do Not Render Arbitration Agreement Unenforceable

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Plaintiff Fintech Fund, FLP filed an action in federal court in the Southern District of Texas asserting claims under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act against Ralph Horne, a citizen of the United Kingdom and CEO of a company to which Fintech had licensed certain financial technology. Fintech claimed that Horne used that relationship to access Fintech’s confidential and proprietary information illegally. Horne moved to dismiss the action (1) for lack of personal jurisdiction and (2) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and improper venue because the matter was subject to an arbitration agreement.

The court rejected Horne’s personal and subject matter jurisdiction arguments, finding that the court had specific jurisdiction over him based on telephone calls he made and emails he sent as part of his allegedly wrongful conduct to a Fintech partner in Texas, and that it had subject matter jurisdiction because Fintech’s claims were for federal statutory violations. Fintech was less successful on the question of venue, however.

Fintech argued that the dispute was not arbitrable because the arbitration agreement was unenforceable and the claims at issue were not covered by it. Fintech said there was no meeting of the minds as to arbitration, as the relevant contract contained an irreconcilable internal inconsistency; the arbitration provision said that all claims against Horne and his company would be resolved by “arbitration under the London Court of International Arbitration (‘LCIA’) Rules,” while a choice of law provision in the same contract said that the courts of England and Wales would have exclusive jurisdiction over such claims. The court found that this apparent inconsistency could be resolved by interpreting them to require that any non-arbitrable claims and disputes regarding arbitrability be brought before courts in England or Wales, while any arbitrable claims must be submitted for arbitration in London. In either case, the agreed upon forum was in the United Kingdom, not the Southern District of Texas. Finding no justification for refusing to enforce the parties agreed upon forum, the court dismissed the action, leaving the question of arbitrability to be decided, if necessary, by a court in England or Wales. Fintech filed its notice of appeal on the same day that the district court entered its order.

Fintech Fund, FLP v. Horne, Civil Action No. H-18-1125 (S.D. Tex. July 6, 2018)

This post written by Jason Brost.

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New York Federal Court Awards Damages for Reinsurance Payments in Lawsuit Against Iran Related to September 11 Attacks

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The Southern District of New York recently granted a motion for damages by insurance plaintiffs in a multidistrict litigation case against Iran stemming from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The court previously entered a default judgment against Iran and tasked a magistrate judge with calculating damages. The present opinion stemmed from plaintiff’s objections to the magistrate’s recommendations that plaintiffs could not recover reinsurance payments made related to the attacks and that prejudgment interest began to accrue on the individual dates of payment of each claim for which plaintiffs sought damages.

First, the court agreed with plaintiffs and awarded damages for the reinsurance payments at issue. Plaintiffs objected to the magistrate’s recommendation because another case in the MDL had previously awarded damages for reinsurance payments (constituting law of the case) and that, contrary to the magistrate’s logic, their subrogation rights did not depend on contractual privity. The Southern District side-stepped the issue of whether the “law of the case” doctrine applied by concluding equitable subrogation, a doctrine sounding in equity rather than contract, does not require contractual privity under New York law. While not officially deciding the law of the case issue, the court in dicta noted the existence of a D.C. federal case allowing recovery for reinsurance payments on an unrelated terrorist attack and that the magistrate provided no basis for distinguishing the present case from the previously decided MDL case.

Second, the court determined that the date of the September 11 terrorist attacks was the appropriate benchmark for when prejudgment interest should start accruing. New York law provides that damages for losses arising in the state incurred at various times may trigger interest either at the date of each loss individually or upon a “single reasonable intermediate date.” Instead of triggering interest accrual for each loss based on the date each claim was paid, the court affixed all prejudgment interest to begin accruing on September 11, 2001 to promote consistency in the MDL cases and avoid complex calculations. As to losses arising outside of New York, the court likewise exercised its broad discretion to select September 11, 2001—the date of the underlying terrorist attack and the date selected for New York losses—to be the date from which prejudgment interest is to be calculated for non-New York losses.

In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, Case No. 03-MDL-1570 (USDC S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018).

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

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Texas High Court Declines to Enforce Compel Arbitration Against Non-Signatory

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In a recent dispute involving a crop insurance policy, the Texas Supreme Court held that an independent insurance agency could not compel arbitration of certain claims brought against it in state court by an insured (JJ Farms) where the agency was not a signatory to the operative arbitration agreement in the subject policy.

The dispositive issue the Texas Supreme Court addressed was the question of arbitrability, on which the court decided the trial court was charged with determining whether a valid arbitration agreement existed because there was no clear and unmistakable evidence that JJ Farms agreed to arbitrate arbitrability with non-signatories such as the agency. Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court reviewed the decision on arbitrability de novo.

On de novo review, the court assessed under a myriad of legal theories whether the underlying arbitration agreement between the insurer (R&H) and JJ Farms allowed for arbitration of disputes with non-signatories. First, the court concluded the insurance policy’s arbitration agreement did not require arbitration with non-signatories because the plain terms limited disagreements to be arbitrated to only those between the insured and insurer. Second, the court rejected an agency theory of arbitrability because R&H did not exercise control over the agency. Third, the court declined to confer third-party beneficiary status upon the agency because the insurance contract did not facially benefit it, nor did any language in the federal statute governing crop insurance grant third-party beneficiary status to insurance agents. Fourth, the court considered and ultimately discarded both direct-benefits estoppel, because the insurance policy did not impose duties or obligations on the agency, and alternative estoppel, because even though JJ Farms’s claims were intertwined with the insurance policy the relationship between R&H and the agency was insufficiently close to infer consent by JJ Farms to arbitrate the dispute.

Jody James Farms, JV v. The Altman Grp., Inc., No. 17-0062 (Tex. May 11, 2018).

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

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Northern District Of New York Allows Evidence That Follow The Fortunes Or Follow The Settlements Provision Could Be Implied In Facultative Reinsurance Certificates

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Munich Reinsurance America, Inc. and Utica Mutual Insurance are headed to a bench trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York in a case regarding two facultative reinsurance certificates issued by Munich to Utica in 1973 and 1977, and the court has ruled on certain motions in limine filed by both parties.

In an earlier ruling on cross motions for summary judgment, the court noted that neither the 1973 nor the 1977 certificates contained a follow the fortunes or follow the settlements provision and declined to find this such a clause was implied in the contracts based on the record before it. Munich filed a motion in limine asking the court to preclude Utica from presenting evidence in support of the existence of a follow the fortunes/settlements provision. The court denied this motion, however, holding that Utica would be allowed to present evidence that “the doctrines of follow the fortunes or follow the settlements were, at the time the parties agreed to the Certificates, so ‘fixed and invariable’ in the reinsurance industry as to be part of the Certificates.” In doing so, however, the court emphasized that it would be Utica’s burden to show that such custom and practice was “fixed and invariable,” and not merely generally understood within the (re)insurance industry during the relevant time period.

The court also considered Munich’s motion to preclude certain testimony by Utica’s expert witnesses regarding trade usage and custom and practice in the reinsurance industry. The court declined to exclude such testimony, doing so largely on the basis that such decisions could better be made in the context of trial and that such exclusions are less necessary in a bench trial “[w]here the gatekeeper and the factfinder are one in the same—that is, the judge . . . .” However, the court granted Munich’s motion to preclude testimony on withdrawn claims and defenses as well as its motion to preclude evidence of decisions from certain other matters, which the court held was hearsay.

Utica was similarly unsuccessful in most of its motions in limine. The court rejected Utica’s request that Munich not be allowed to make certain arguments about the meaning of the 1973 and 1977 certificates on the basis of collateral estoppel. The court found that this interpretation was an issue of law, and “collateral estoppel does not operate to bar relitigation of pure issues of law.” However, the court granted Utica’s motion to preclude the use of a privilege log it produced in the litigation, which Munich argued was admissible to show when Utica considered certain issues, finding that there was no relevant, nonspeculative inference that could be drawn from that log.

Utica Mutual Insurance Company v. Munich Reinsurance America, Inc., 6:13-cv-00196(BKS/ATB) (N.D.N.Y. June 27, 2018)

This post written by Jason Brost.

See our disclaimer.