Michael Wolgin

LESS THAN TWO WEEKS BEFORE TRIAL, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE IN UTICA V. FIREMAN’S FUND RULES ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

December 11, 2017 by Michael Wolgin

This case concerns an action filed by Utica Mutual Insurance Company (Utica) against its reinsurer, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (FFIC) seeking to enforce certain reinsurance contracts against FFIC with respect to $35,000,000 Utica spent in settling a dispute with its insured, Goulds, regarding coverage for thousands of asbestos claims from the 1990s. Presently at issue were (1) Utica’s motion to preclude FFIC’s expert Garrett Redmond, (2) FFIC’s motion to preclude five specific evidentiary matters, and (3) Utica’s omnibus motion in limine regarding various evidentiary issues it anticipated to arise at trial.

Utica sought to preclude Redmond from offering testimony that Utica misrepresented or omitted facts to Fireman’s Fund in 1966 through 1972 relating to whether the primary policies it issued to Goulds had aggregate limits and that the primary policies Utica issued to Goulds did not have aggregate limits. The Court ultimately granted Utica’s motion to the extent that it precluded Redmond from testifying that Utica did in fact make misrepresentations to Fireman’s Fund in obtaining the reinsurance policies and that the primary policies in question did in fact lack aggregate limits. The Court noted, however, that “[d]ue to how much time has passed since these policies were issued, there are no witnesses who were personally involved with negotiating or writing the policies [and] [a]s a result, both sides will attempt to offer circumstantial evidence and testimony regarding the usual practices at that time in order to support their positions on the existence of aggregate limits.”

The Court denied FFIC’s motion to preclude Utica’s argument that FFIC had constructive notice of the loss, reasoning that “[w]hile the law in New York requires actual notice and not constructive notice, any facts showing that Fireman’s Fund had prior knowledge of the Goulds loss are relevant to Fireman’s Fund’s claimed prejudice.” However, the court granted, among other requests, FFIC’s motion to preclude Utica from introducing judicial decisions or settlements involving other insurer’s challenges to Utica’s aggregate limit position. In the same light, the Court granted Utica’s motion to preclude evidence of other disputes, holding that “disputes with other reinsurers under different facts are irrelevant and inadmissible.” Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., Case No. 6:09-cv-00853 (USDC N.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

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TREASURY RELEASES REPORT ON ASSET MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE

November 28, 2017 by Michael Wolgin

The U.S. Department of the Treasury has released a report entitled “A Financial System that Creates Economic Opportunities: Asset Management and Insurance,” the third of four reports to be issued by the Department in response to Executive Order 13772 of February 3, 2017, in which President Trump set forth a set of “Core Principles” to be applied by his administration in the regulation of the financial system. The report includes numerous recommendations, including:

moving away from entity-based system risk evaluations of insurance companies and towards an activities-based approach that would identify business activities that have higher systemic risk characteristics;
harmonizing the group capital initiative of the NAIC, the states, and the Federal Reserve to reduce the existence of duplicative regulatory burdens for insurers;
recommending that the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, in developing its Insurance Capital Standard, “recognize the diverse approaches to solvency” by various regulators to ensure that the business model of U.S. insurance companies and the state-based insurance regulatory system of the U.S. are accommodated;
clarifying, through legislative action, the “business of insurance” exception of Dodd-Frank to ensure that the CFPB is not overseeing activities already regulated by state insurance regulators;
taking steps to encourage private insurers to participate in the market for terrorism insurance;
recommending that states adopt the NAIC Insurance Data Security Model Law and, if uniform requirements are not adopted in five years, passing federal legislation setting forth data breach notification standards specific to insurers;
encouraging the sharing of information within the insurance industry regarding issues related to cybersecurity;
encouraging the consultation of and participation by state governments when the business of insurance is impacted by the decisions of federal agencies and regulators;
directing the Federal Insurance Office to advocate for the U.S. state-based insurance regulatory system before the International Association of Insurance Supervisors and recommending that the FIO have a permanent, voting membership on the IAIS Executive Committee.

While some of these recommendations are within the direct power of the executive branch, most will require the cooperation of Congress, state regulators, or other bodies outside of the President’s control, making it an open question how successful President Trump will be in implementing the ideas described in the report.

This post written by Jason Brost.
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ODYSSEY REINSURANCE OBTAINS $3.2 MILLION DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIONS STEMMING FROM FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS MADE BY UNDERWRITER

November 24, 2017 by Michael Wolgin

Odyssey Reinsurance Company obtained a $3.2 million default judgment on October 4, 2017, against Cal-Regent Insurance Services Corporation and Pacific Brokers Insurance Services (“PBIS”) as a result of fraudulent transfers made between the two companies and the owner/officers of both companies, Richard and Diane Nagby. Cal-Regent underwrote a number of insurance risks which were subsequently reinsured by Odyssey. The two companies entered into a series of reinsurance agreements that required an annual “provisional commission” to be paid to Cal-Regent. The provisional commission was “adjusted” at year-end depending on the profitability of the business underwritten by Cal-Regent. After settlement of a lawsuit by another company involved in the transactions, it became clear that the amount of “return commissions” Cal-Regent would owe Odyssey due to the annual adjustments were likely to substantially increase. Recognizing this possibility, the Nagbys “embarked on a plan to strip Cal-Regent of assets.”

Odyssey obtained a judgment against Cal-Regent in 2015 for $3.2 million to recover the amount of return commissions it was owed. The Nagbys, however, had previously formed PBIS and “caused Cal-Regent to transfer substantially all of its assets to PBIS.” Three months after oral argument in Odyssey’s initial action against Cal-Regent and three months before judgment was entered, the Nagby’s “caused PBIS to sell substantially all of its assets to AmTrust for $5 million.” AmTrust made an initial payment of $3 million which was distributed to the Nagbys. Odyssey filed the present action on March 21, 2017, alleging liability under California’s Uniform Voidable Transactions Act and alter ego and successor liability law.

The court granted default judgments as well as preliminary injunctions against the Nagbys enjoining them from disposing of the AmTrust proceeds despite recognizing that such an injunction was an “extraordinary and drastic remedy.” Because the Defendants defaulted on Odyssey’s 2017 complaint, the “well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, [were] taken as true.” The Court found that Odyssey had sufficiently pled facts to support each of its causes of action as well as sufficient evidence to support an award of the full amount prayed for, plus post-judgment interest running from the 2015 judgment. Odyssey Reinsurance Co. v. Nagby, Case No. 16-cv-03038 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2017).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.

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COURT AFFIRMS DISMISSAL OF CLAIM FOR COMMISSIONS FOR PLACEMENT OF PUERTO RICAN PUBLIC LIABILITY INSURANCE

November 23, 2017 by Michael Wolgin

Plaintiffs Berkley Risk Solutions LLC, an insurance and reinsurance management services provider, and Admiral Insurance Co., an excess and surplus lines insurer, sued Industrial Re-International Inc., a New York reinsurance intermediary, and its founder, concerning certain commissions for public liability insurance placed with municipalities in Puerto Rico through American Foreign Underwriters Corp. (AFU), a licensed general agency. The dispute began when AFU filed a lawsuit against Industrial Re and Plaintiffs in Puerto Rico alleging that Industrial Re had agreed to split the commissions on policies written for 2006-2007 equally with AFU. Industrial Re and AFU resolved their dispute and executed a settlement agreement in which they agreed that the commission on any future policies with the municipalities would be split 60 percent to Industrial Re and 40 percent to AFU. Industrial Re obtained a judgment against AFU for the payment of its portion of the commissions that AFU received on subsequent policies according to the settlement; however, Industrial Re’s attempts to collect against AFU were unsuccessful. Industrial Re then claimed that Plaintiffs owed it for the judgment obtained against AFU. Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit underlying this appeal, seeking a declaration that they were not obligated to Industrial Re for the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 policy commissions. Industrial Re responded by asserting counterclaims based on promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment and tortious interference.

Plaintiffs prevailed in the trial court, and the appellate court has now affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Regarding promissory estoppel, the court held that Industrial Re did “not dispute that plaintiffs were not parties to the Settlement Agreement [with AFU] and have produced no evidence that plaintiffs agreed to be bound by the Settlement Agreement at any time.” Moreover, it found that “[a]lthough plaintiffs acknowledged in an August 2008 email they ‘were previously advised’ to distribute the commission in accordance with the Settlement Agreement, their willingness to do so […] was explicitly dependent upon receiving a written stipulation from both defendants and AFU to that effect,” which never occurred, and thus, never became binding. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Industrial Re’s claim based on the expiration of the statute of limitations of the State of New Jersey; New Jersey had a “substantial interest” in resolving disputes arising out of business dealings between two of its own corporations and no “exceptional circumstances” justified the application of the law of Puerto Rico. Berkley Risk Solutions LLC v. Indus. Re-Int’l Inc., Case No. A-2366-15T1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 20, 2017).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

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LONG-TIME REINSURANCE ATTORNEY RULED NOT QUALIFIED TO ARBITRATE 9/11 WORLD TRADE CENTER REINSURANCE DISPUTE

November 22, 2017 by Michael Wolgin

An attorney with “considerably more than ten years’ experience of insurance and reinsurance law” has been deemed unqualified to arbitrate a reinsurance dispute stemming from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. The arbitration agreement called for an arbitration tribunal consisting of “persons with not less than ten years’ experience of insurance or reinsurance.” The High Court of Justice, Business and Property Courts of England and Wales, determined that this language required appointment of an individual with more than ten years’ experience in the business of insurance or reinsurance, rather than the law of insurance or reinsurance.

The court’s determination was largely dictated by a 2000 decision in which the judge held that the parties to an arbitration agreement utilizing the same language intended a “trade arbitration” meaning “the tribunal was to consist of persons from the trade or business of insurance or reinsurance.” Although the court acknowledged the strength of the argument that the “ordinary and natural meaning” of “experience of insurance or reinsurance included experience acquired not only from working within the insurance and reinsurance industry but also from working with or on behalf of that industry,” the court nevertheless held that the previous decision was not so “obviously wrong” that the precedential decision (Company X v. Company Y date July 17, 2000), should be departed from.

The court relied in part on the fact that the 2000 decision was “mentioned in Butler & Merkin’s Reinsurance Law … at paragraph C-0729.” This was accepted as evidence that the decision was “fairly well known in the legal/reinsurance claims community.” Therefore, in light of “the importance of precedent,” if the parties had intended a different meaning than that adopted in the “fairly well known” prior case, they would have used different language. As such, the court ruled that legal insurance or reinsurance experience was not sufficient under the clause and the attorney could not be appointed as an arbitrator. Tonicstar Ltd. v. Allianz Ins. PLC, [2017] EWHC (Comm) 2753.

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.

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