Kenneth Cesta

Ninth Circuit Reverses Order Denying Motion to Compel Arbitration, Concluding “Delegation Provision” Is Enforceable

January 25, 2024 by Kenneth Cesta

Noting the court was deciding, as a matter of first impression, “what a party must do to specifically challenge a delegation provision and what a court may consider when evaluating this challenge,” the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bielski v. Coinbase Inc., reversed a district court order that denied defendant Coinbase’s motion to compel arbitration.

Coinbase is an online cryptocurrency exchange. Plaintiff Abraham Bielski maintained an account, or “digital wallet,” with Coinbase that allowed him to store and transfer cryptocurrency in and out of his account. Before opening his account, Bielski was required to accept Coinbase’s user agreement, which included a three-step process to resolve any disputes: (i) an “informal complaint process,” which involved contacting Coinbase and attempting to resolve the dispute amicably; (ii) a “formal complaint process” involving a written complaint; and (iii) arbitration of the dispute pursuant to an arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement included a “delegation provision” providing that disputes arising out of the agreement including the “enforceability, revocability, scope, or validity” of the agreement were delegated to the arbitrator.

Shortly after opening his account, a dispute arose involving an unauthorized transfer from Bielski’s digital wallet. Bielski “live chatted” with company representatives, called the company hotline, and wrote two letters requesting help to recover his funds. He then filed a lawsuit under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Regulation E alleging Coinbase failed to investigate the unauthorized transfer of funds from his account. Coinbase moved to compel arbitration of the claims under the user agreement. The district court denied the motion to compel concluding the arbitration agreement and the delegation provision were “inseverable” and unconscionable.

On appeal, Bielski argued that the delegation provision and the arbitration agreement were unconscionable and unenforceable. The court first addressed what a party must do to challenge a delegation provision, and what a court may consider in evaluating the challenge. Coinbase argued on appeal that Bielski did not do enough to challenge the delegation provision. The court rejected this argument, concluding that by specifically objecting to the delegation provision in his opposition to the motion to compel, Bielski sufficiently challenged the provision. The court noted its approach was consistent with decisions in the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits, but contrary to the approach in the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, which require a party to provide “more substance in their delegation provision challenge.” The court then addressed what a court may consider in evaluating the challenge, concluding that “a court must be able to interpret that provision in the context of the agreement as a whole, which may require examining the underlying arbitration agreement as well.” Finally, the court rejected Bielski’s argument that the delegation provision was unconscionable, held that the district court erred in refusing to enforce the delegation provision, and reversed the order denying Coinbase’s motion to compel arbitration.

Bielski v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 22-15566 (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 2023).

Third Circuit Affirms Order Denying Motion to Compel Arbitration After AAA Declines to Administer Arbitration

January 23, 2024 by Kenneth Cesta

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed a district court decision denying defendant MicroBilt Corp.’s motion to compel arbitration, finding the plaintiff had fully complied with all provisions of her arbitration agreement with MicroBilt.

In connection with a loan plaintiff Maria Del Rosario Hernandez applied for in 2020, the lender utilized a product offered by MicroBilt, referred to as an “instant bank verification report,” which allowed the lender to verify Hernandez’s identity and financial information. The verification report included information for other persons with the Hernandez name, including a person who was on a government watch list that caused the lender to deny Hernandez’s loan application.

After Hernandez filed a lawsuit alleging MicroBilt violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, MicroBilt filed a motion to compel arbitration, relying on an arbitration provision that was part of the loan application process. The arbitration provision included an “exclusive resolution” clause, which required that any disputes or claims be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration. The arbitration provision also stated the arbitration would be conducted by a single arbitrator in accordance with AAA rules, punitive and consequential damages were not recoverable, and each party would be responsible for its own attorneys’ fees. Hernandez dismissed her lawsuit and submitted the claim to the AAA. Treating the matter as a “consumer agreement” under the AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules, the AAA administrator assigned to the matter notified MicroBilt that the damages limitation included in the arbitration provision conflicted with Principle 14 of the consumer due process protocol of the rules, which requires that an arbitrator “should be empowered to grant whatever relief would be available in court under law or equity.” MicroBilt refused to waive the damages limitation and the AAA declined to administer the arbitration under Rule 1(d). Hernandez then reinstated her claims in the district court and MicroBilt moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion to compel, finding Hernandez had fully complied with the arbitration provision.

In affirming the district court’s denial of the motion to compel, the Third Circuit recognized the arbitration provision covered Hernandez’s claims but noted that under 9 U.S.C. § 4, it “may compel arbitration only where there is a ‘failure, neglect, or refusal … to arbitrate under a written agreement.’” The court found the district court’s denial of MicroBilt’s motion was correct because Hernandez was in full compliance with the relevant arbitration provisions. As a result, the court concluded it lacked authority under section 4 to compel arbitration. The court also rejected MicroBilt’s argument that the AAA administrator’s requirement that MicroBilt waive the damages limitation was an “arbitrability” issue that should have been resolved by the arbitrator. The court found that, under Consumer Rule 14(a), arbitrators have the exclusive power to rule on “the existence, scope, or validity” of an arbitration provision, and the administrator’s decision to dismiss the arbitration did not implicate any of those issues. The court also rejected MicroBilt’s argument that the “exclusive resolution” clause of the arbitration provision conflicts with Hernandez pursuing her claims in court. The court noted that Hernandez has fully complied with the AAA rules, and “[s]everal courts have allowed plaintiffs to return to court after administrative dismissals under Rule 1(d), despite general agreements to arbitrate.” The court affirmed the district court’s decision denying defendant MicroBilt’s motion to compel arbitration.

Hernandez v. MicroBilt Corp., No. 22-3135 (3d Cir. Dec. 5, 2023).

District of Illinois Directs Insurer to Supplement Record to Support Privilege Based on “Common Interest Doctrine”

December 8, 2023 by Kenneth Cesta

In Ansur America Insurance Co. v. Borland, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois addressed a discovery dispute involving claims brought by Ansur America Insurance Co. against the law firm Ansur retained to defend an insured in an underlying product liability action. Ansur alleged that the defendants failed to defend the case in a reasonable manner, which resulted in Ansur having to settle the case at a substantially increased amount. The defendants sought the production of several categories of documents from Ansur regarding its handling of the underlying claim. Ansur withheld or redacted numerous documents asserting the attorney-client and work product privileges. The defendants filed a motion to compel production disputing Ansur’s privilege assertions.

The court first addressed whether certain claims department and corporate officers listed on Ansur’s privilege log were control group members, which would support the application of the privileges to their communications. The court found Ansur established that some of the individuals were in fact members of the control group and that their communications were privileged. With regard to the other individuals who were not within the control group, the court directed Ansur to produce their communications.

The court then addressed the defendants’ arguments that Ansur should be required to produce documents Ansur shared with its reinsurers regarding the underlying product liability claim. Ansur opposed production, contending the common interest doctrine provides a basis for withholding the production of the reinsurance-related documents at issue. The common interest doctrine “extends a preexisting privilege to communications made in the presence of third parties for the purpose of coordinating a defense strategy or pooling information for common legal purpose.” Ansur argued the doctrine applied because it “shared an identical interest with its reinsurers and therefore, the privilege was not lost by their sharing of documents.” The court concluded that, based on the motion papers, it was unable to determine whether the common interest doctrine was applicable. The court noted it must first examine the communications at issue to determine whether the underlying privileges exist. Recognizing Ansur and its reinsurers do share a common legal interest, and that the common interest doctrine could apply to certain communications and documents, the court directed Ansur to review the documents and determine if they were “made in connection with the provision of legal services and was not just discussing the availability of reinsurance,” after which the court would conduct an in camera review of the documents.

Ansur America Insurance Co. v. Borland, No. 3:21-cv-00059 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2023).

Ninth Circuit Affirms District Court Order Granting Motion to Compel Arbitration of Discrimination Claims

December 6, 2023 by Kenneth Cesta

In Jackson v. Applied Materials Corp., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court order granting a motion to compel arbitration of the plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims, finding the arbitration agreement entered into by the parties was valid and encompassed the disputes before the court.

The court did not address the underlying facts of the case in its memorandum opinion, other than to note the matter involved claims of discrimination and retaliation brought by Jackson against his former employer. In affirming the district court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, the court noted it had jurisdiction to conduct a de novo review of the matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Relying on Ninth Circuit authority confirming that the Federal Arbitration Act “requires that district courts refer cases to arbitration where a valid arbitration agreement covers the dispute at issue,” the court found that the district court properly granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration “because the parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement encompassing the dispute at issue.” Relying on additional Ninth Circuit precedent, the court also based its decision on a finding that Jackson did not establish any of the grounds for vacating, modifying, or correcting the underlying arbitration awards in favor of the defendant under 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11. Finally, the court refused to consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal, and affirmed the district court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.

Jackson v. Applied Materials Corp., No. 22-16673 (9th Cir. Oct. 18, 2023).

SDNY Confirms Arbitration Award Under New York Convention

November 10, 2023 by Kenneth Cesta

In Exclusive Trim Inc. v. Kastamonu Romania, S.A., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a petition to confirm and enforce a foreign arbitration award issued in an arbitration held before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution.

The parties entered into a supply agreement, which, among other terms, set forth the minimum amount of product to be purchased by the petitioner from the respondent in the first year. The agreement also included an arbitration provision requiring all controversies and claims be resolved through arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA), and “judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.” A dispute arose between the parties and the petitioner filed an arbitration proceeding with the AAA alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The matter was assigned to the AAA’s international division, the International Centre for Dispute Resolution. After an evidentiary hearing held in New York, the arbitrator issued an award for the petitioner on its claims and rejected the respondent’s counterclaim. The award required the respondent to make payment within 30 days.

After the respondent failed to satisfy the award, the petitioner filed a petition under the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act to confirm and enforce the award. The respondent did not oppose the petition. In reviewing the petition, the district court concluded it had jurisdiction over the matter, noting that the four requirements for determining whether an arbitration agreement falls within the scope of the New York Convention had been met: “(1) there must be a written agreement; (2) it must provide for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the convention; (3) the subject matter must be commercial; and (4) it cannot be entirely domestic in scope.” The court then analyzed the applicable standard of review for the matter, noting that it must enforce the arbitration award unless one of the seven defenses under the New York Convention was established. The court noted that the respondent had not appeared in the action or opposed the petition, and “if a petition to enforce an arbitration award is unopposed, a court need not inquire on its own into whether an exception to enforcement applies” and, in any event, there was no suggestion in the record that any of the defenses under the New York Convention were applicable. The court held that the petitioner established it was entitled to judgment in its favor in accordance with the award and granted the petition.

Exclusive Trim, Inc. v. Kastamonu Romania, S.A., No. 1:23-cv-03410 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2023).