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New Jersey Supreme Court Affirms $56M Refund to Johnson & Johnson for Overpayment of Insurance Premium Tax

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The New Jersey Supreme Court recently ruled that Johnson & Johnson is required to pay an insurance premium tax (IPT) based only on its premiums for risks located within the state of New Jersey rather than nationwide, entitling the company to a $56 million tax refund.

Prior to 2011, New Jersey insurance laws required J&J, as a holder of self-procured insurance, to pay its IPT based only on risks located in New Jersey. However, in a 2011 amendment to the state’s insurance laws, the Legislature authorized additional taxation on surplus lines insurance policies by adding the following sentence to N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64: “If a surplus lines policy covers risks or exposures in this State and other states, where this State is the home state, … the tax payable pursuant to this section shall be based on the total United States premium for the applicable policy.” J&J, despite not being a holder of surplus lines coverage, thereafter voluntarily increased its IPT payments to reflect the amount due on its nationwide insurance premiums. In November 2015, J&J filed a claim with the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance (DOBI) and the director of the Division of Taxation, seeking a refund of nearly $56 million in excess IPT that it had paid since 2011.

After the division denied its refund claim, J&J filed a complaint in the Tax Court. The Tax Court found in favor of the DOBI and the division, concluding that the 2011 amendments that authorized the collection of IPT for surplus lines insurance coverage based on total nationwide premiums applied equally to self-procured coverage. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that J&J’s IPT obligations should have continued to be based solely on the risks it insured that were located within New Jersey. Stressing that the original plain language of the statute “clearly limited J&J’s tax liability to the risks it insured in New Jersey [and] was not changed in any way, shape, or form in the 2011 amendment,” the Appellate Division explained that it was “bound to follow and apply” that language. The Appellate Division ultimately declared itself unable to conclude that the New Jersey Legislature, by specifically stating that the amendment applied only to surplus lines insurance coverage, likewise intended to extend it to self-procured coverage.

In a one-paragraph majority decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the ruling “substantially for the reasons expressed” by the Appellate Division.

New York Federal Court Confirms $2M Arbitral Award to Defunct Liquor Distributor in Dispute Over Royalties Owed to Rapper Snoop Dogg

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This royalties dispute arose out of an agreement between Cognac Ferrand S.A.S., a French company that produces and sells various liquors and spirits, and Mystique Brands LLC, a company that imports and markets liquors and spirits in the United States, involving the importation and marketing of Ferrand’s cognac in the United States.

In 2008, the parties executed a contract in which Ferrand granted Mystique the five-year exclusive right to import and market certain products in the United States. Under that agreement, Mystique agreed to purchase certain minimum amounts of Ferrand’s products each year and to enter into a marketing agreement with the musical artist Calvin Brodus, aka Snoop Dogg, for the promotion of those products, the costs of which Mystique would pay. The agreement granted Ferrand the right to terminate the agreement if Mystique became insolvent or filed a bankruptcy petition, or if Mystique committed a “material breach” that it failed to cure within 30 days.

Ferrand terminated the agreement roughly a year later in 2010, citing Mystique’s purported insolvency and unpaid royalties owed to Snoop Dogg. Mystique then initiated arbitration proceedings before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in New York (ICDR) against Ferrand claiming wrongful termination. Ferrand fought back with a $4.5 million counterclaim, alleging it had been fraudulently induced to enter the deal because Mystique lied about its finances.

The arbitration proceeding was stayed after Mystique filed bankruptcy in 2013, but once Mystique emerged from Chapter 11 in 2017, Ferrand sought to reinstate the arbitration proceeding so that it could pursue its counterclaims against Mystique. The ICDR advised that the matter had been closed administratively, and directed Ferrand to file a new notice of arbitration. The parties proceeded in a new arbitration before a new ICDR arbitrator in New York.

In May 2020, the new arbitrator in New York found in Mystique’s favor and dismissed all of Ferrand’s claims. There, the arbitrator found that Mystique did not breach its minimum purchase obligation or repudiate the agreement and that Mystique’s insolvency did not constitute a material breach. The arbitrator also rejected Ferrand’s breach of contract claim for Mystique’s failure to pay Snoop Dogg because Ferrand had not offered evidence of damages or causation. Finding that Mystique was the “prevailing party,” the arbitrator also awarded Mystique $2 million in attorneys’ fees and costs.

Ferrand thereafter sought relief in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, filing a petition to vacate the arbitral award pursuant to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Ferrand argued that the arbitrator erred by finding that Mystique was the prevailing party in the arbitration and wrongly awarded Mystique nearly $2 million in fees and costs. Mystique opposed the petition and cross-petitioned to confirm the award, also seeking sanctions under both 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 against Ferrand for pursuing this action.

The district court denied Ferrand’s petition to vacate the award, finding that the arbitrator did not exceed her authority or act in manifest disregard and that the award was final and definite. The district court determined that Ferrand’s challenge amounted to a mere substantive disagreement with the arbitrator’s reasoning and ultimate determination, which is not a valid basis to overturn the award. Because Ferrand failed to show that any aspect of the award should be vacated, the district court granted Mystique’s cross-petition to confirm the award.

Cognac Ferrand S.A.S. v. Mystique Brands, LLC, No. 1:20-cv-05933 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2021).

Seventh Circuit Affirms Wisconsin Federal Court’s Finding That Arbitration Panel’s Decision Was Arbitrary and Capricious Where It Was Contrary to the Evidence in the Record

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This action arises out of a grievance filed by Theresa Taylor, a blind vending machine operator, with the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development (DWD) over the DWD’s decision to award Jocelyn Belsha, another blind applicant, a bid to operate the vending machine at the Racine/Sturtevant correctional facility over Taylor. In 2007, Taylor accepted the DWD’s invitation to run the vending machines at three Wisconsin correctional facilities on an interim basis. In 2011, the DWD bid out these sites on a permanent basis, granting Belsha a bid to operate the vending machine at the Racine/Sturtevant correctional site.

In July 2015, the DWD convened a three-member arbitration panel to hear Taylor’s grievance.  The arbitration took place in September 2017, and in February 2018, the arbitration panel rendered a decision finding that the DWD “acted in an arbitrary, capricious and biased manner” when it failed to award Taylor the Racine/Sturtevant site during the two selection processes and that Taylor had proved her case “by substantial evidence,” even though she would have also prevailed under a “preponderance of the evidence” test.

The DWD filed a petition for judicial review of the arbitration panel’s decision favoring Taylor. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin vacated the arbitration award, ruling that there were no material deficiencies in the choice of Belsha for the Racine/Sturtevant site, the arbitration panel’s key factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence, and the arbitration panel’s ultimate conclusion was arbitrary and capricious.

Taylor appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit held that Taylor’s appointment to Racine/Sturtevant by the arbitration panel ran afoul of administrative procedure in several ways.

First, the arbitration panel misapprehended the burden of proof — the Seventh Circuit held that preponderance of the evidence, rather than substantial evidence, was the correct burden of proof during the arbitration proceeding and that the arbitration panel fundamentally erred when it applied the substantial evidence standard.

Second, the key factual findings by the arbitration panel were not supported by substantial evidence — the Seventh Circuit held that the panel’s finding that the DWD should have evaluated Taylor based on earlier profitability data rather than more recent data in reinterviews was not supported by substantial evidence, under the Randolph-Sheppard Act, since there were only two questions in the selection criteria that assessed profitability data, and the record did not contain evidence of what operators’ scores would have been using recent data.

Third, the Seventh Circuit found that the arbitration panel’s decision for Taylor as the best operator for the Racine/Sturtevant site was contrary to the evidence and thus arbitrary and capricious.

State of Wisconsin, Dep’t of Workforce Development-Division of Vocational Rehabilitation v. U.S. Dep’t of Education, 980 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2020).

Texas Federal Judge Declines to Rule on Procedural Issues in Multiple Successive Arbitrations Filed by Same Parties, Leaving Dispute to Arbitrators

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This litigation involved 21 parties spread across six different arbitrations in front of six different arbitrators. The litigation arose out of a dispute between two doctors, their business entities, and captive insurers (the plaintiffs), and a lawyer, law firm, and its affiliates (the defendants). The doctors engaged the defendants to create captive insurers and tax shelters for the doctors. After the U.S. Tax Court issued a ruling with negative consequences for the shelters, the doctors asked the defendants to “liquidate and wind down” the doctors’ program, but the defendants refused.

The Arbitrations

Both sides sought arbitration: the defendants brought the first arbitration in Houston, Texas, before Judge Dorfman, and the plaintiffs brought the second arbitration in Louisiana before Judge Duval. The plaintiffs also commenced a lawsuit against the defendants in Texas state court, alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, tort, legal malpractice, and breach of professional obligations, which was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, in which the defendants moved to compel the doctors’ business entities’ participation in the Texas arbitration. The plaintiffs responded with a cross-motion to compel the defendants to join in the Louisiana arbitration and to challenge the Texas arbitration, while also seeking a stay of the Texas arbitration pending a ruling on the motions. The defendants then initiated a third arbitration before Judge Baker in Houston Texas, asserting additional claims that the defendants were denied leave to supplement their arbitration demand in the first arbitration.

The district court granted the defendants’ motion to compel and ordered the parties to arbitrate two of their disputes before Judge Dorfman and Judge Baker in Houston, relying on a written arbitration agreement between the parties that required all arbitrations to be conducted in Houston. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to compel arbitration in Louisiana and stayed the arbitration pending before Judge Duval and the related proceedings in the federal litigation so that the Texas arbitration could go forward. The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision to stay the litigation.

While the district court was making its decision to stay the litigation, the plaintiffs filed a fourth arbitration before arbitrator Robert Kutcher in Louisiana. The plaintiffs thereafter filed a fifth arbitration, based on allegedly newly discovered facts, before Judge Medley in Louisiana, and a sixth arbitration before Judge Gill-Jefferson in Louisiana, but the plaintiffs requested that the new arbitrations be held in Houston.

Defendants’ Emergency Motion to Lift the Stay

After the district court issued its decision to stay the litigation, the defendants filed an emergency motion asking the district court to lift its stay and enjoin the fourth, fifth, and sixth arbitrations, arguing that these Louisiana arbitrations were proceeding in an improper venue and were inefficient “copycat” arbitrations seeking to resolve the same “core dispute” at issue in the Judge Baker and Judge Dorfman arbitrations in Texas.

The district court found no appropriate circumstances justifying an order lifting the stay in the case or staying the recently filed fourth, fifth, and sixth arbitrations. The district court recognized the interesting procedural questions that arose with respect to whether only the final hearing, or also interim hearings, must occur in Houston — as the arbitrators in these later-filed arbitrations were hearing disputes virtually via Zoom and some had issued interim decisions from Louisiana, but none had required the parties to travel to Louisiana. The district court also rejected the defendants’ argument that the fourth, fifth, and sixth arbitrations were inefficient “copycat” arbitrations, noting that the arbitration agreement did not preclude the parties from proceeding with separate arbitrations for disputes involving overlapping but different facts.

However, the district court concluded that while the more recently filed arbitrations must “proceed” in Houston under the arbitration agreement, the required location for interim hearings, the manner in which arbitrators must appear in a location, and permissible consolidation procedures are disputes about procedural questions that are best left for the arbitrators to address, not the court.

Defendants’ Motion to Confirm the Final Award

After the emergency motion was filed, Judge Dorfman issued a final award in the first arbitration, finding that the defendants were not required to immediately wind down and liquidate the captive insurers. The defendants moved to confirm that award before the district court.

The plaintiffs argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to lift the stay it imposed in the litigation and confirm the award by Judge Dorfman because the plaintiffs were appealing the district court’s decision allowing arbitration before Judge Dorfman. Rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that it lacked jurisdiction to lift the stay, the district court noted that this case involved several arbitrations that were not implicated by the plaintiffs’ appeal, and thus it had jurisdiction to lift the stay to address issues in arbitration proceedings not implicated by the plaintiffs’ appeal.

The district court, however, agreed with the plaintiffs that their appeal targeted Judge Dorfman’s appointment and his ability to preside over the parties’ arbitration. Because the defendants were asking the district court to confirm an award Judge Dorfman granted, which would require the district court to decide that Judge Dorfman had the power to grant an arbitration award, the district court recognized that such a decision may conflict with a decision of the appellate court. The district court therefore declined to exercise jurisdiction over issues currently on appeal.

The district court explained that these proceedings were “inefficient and messy” when it compelled arbitration back in August 2020, but since “the parties applied their contract to make this mess but agreed that arbitration would resolve their disputes, no matter how messy,” the district court was not going to “step in to clean it up and risk making it worse.” The district court simply refused to interfere.

Sullivan v. Feldman, No. 4:20-cv-02236 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2020).

Second Circuit Declines to Vacate Foreign Arbitral Award Under New York Convention Absent Valid Reason

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In this case, plaintiff Rodrigo Pagaduan was injured while serving as a motorman on a Carnival Cruise Line ship. The Second Circuit previously affirmed the Eastern District of New York’s order compelling arbitration, and the case was ordered to be arbitrated in the Philippines. The Philippine labor arbiter’s decision granted Pagaduan $5,100 in “sickness allowance,” plus attorneys’ fees of 10% of the award, but declined to provide other relief. Pagaduan filed a motion seeking nonenforcement and/or vacatur of the award, which was denied by the district court.

Pagaduan appealed the district court’s denial, invoking the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention), which provides that a court “shall confirm [a foreign arbitral] award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention.” Pagaduan argued that the award should not be confirmed based on two grounds of the New York Convention.

First, Pagaduan argued that article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention applied, which allows for nonenforcement where “[t]he party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case.” Pagaduan argued that he had not been given proper notice of the proceedings and was unable to present his case. The Second Circuit rejected Pagaduan’s argument, finding that Pagaduan submitted multiple lengthy briefs, medical records, and affidavits before the labor arbiter, but chose to focus his arguments almost entirely on whether the arbiter had jurisdiction over the case, which left him limited room to argue the merits of his case (such as how the Jones Act or Philippine law would provide a greater recovery). Although Pagaduan pointed to errors in the arbitration proceedings, the Second Circuit found that none of them suggested that he was denied the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time or manner. Therefore, the Second Circuit did not believe that the first ground applied.

Second, Pagaduan argued that article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention applied, which allows for nonenforcement where “[t]he recognition of enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.” Pagaduan argued that the lesser remedies available under Philippine law contravene U.S. policy to provide special solicitude to seamen under the Jones Act. The Second Circuit again rejected Pagaduan’s argument, finding the fact that the award was arguably smaller than Pagaduan might have recovered under the Jones Act was not so contrary to public policy as to “violate our most basic notions of morality and justice.” As federal public policy is not violated “merely because foreign law would provide a lesser or different remedy in a particular area of the law,” the Second Circuit declined to set aside the award and affirmed the order of the district court.

Pagaduan v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-3400 (2d Cir. Nov. 25, 2020).