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Ninth Circuit Vacates “Bizarre” Arbitration Award in Drug-Related Employment Termination Dispute

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In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed a district court’s order confirming an arbitration award in favor of a former Costco employee who had been fired for selling cocaine on company property. The arbitrator found that the employee’s termination was barred by the doctrine of “industrial double jeopardy,” because he had already incurred a three-day suspension for his conduct, and awarded that the employee be “made whole.”

The Ninth Circuit took issue with the fundamental fairness of the arbitration proceedings. Following the presentation of evidence, the arbitrator engaged in extensive ex parte communications with the terminated employee and the Teamsters Union, which had represented the employee at arbitration. The arbitrator also conveyed a $6,000 settlement offer to the employee, which Costco was unaware of and had not authorized. When rendering his decision, the arbitrator did so via a “vague and bizarre” email sent only to the Teamsters Union, which said: “The above named grievant prevails in his grievance. The Union’s arguments as to double jeopardy were correct. Union remedy is adopted. So that I can look at myself in the mirror, my resignation is effective today.” The arbitrator failed to provide any reasoned basis for his decision, without any finding of fact or statement of law. He then resigned after rendering his email judgment.

Acknowledging the high standard that must be met to vacate an arbitration award, the Ninth Circuit ultimately decided that the arbitration proceedings deprived Costco of a fundamentally fair hearing, and entitled Costco to vacatur of the award. “For all we know,” the majority commented, “the arbitrator flipped a coin, consulted a ouija board, or threw darts at a dartboard to determine the outcome.” The court concluded: “No Party agreeing to arbitration bargained for a proceeding such as this.”

SDNY Vacates Arbitration Award in International Maritime Shipping Dispute

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Petitioner Copragri and respondent Agribusiness United DMCC are foreign buyers and sellers of feed and grain, respectively, who entered into sales agreements for grain cargoes. Pursuant to its obligations under the sales agreements, Agribusiness chartered a vessel from Vitosha Maritime Ltd. to transport the grain cargoes from Louisiana to Morocco. The vessel’s master issued bills of lading for the cargoes to Agribusiness. Copragri was not a party to the bills of lading, the back of which included a provision calling for arbitration in New York.

After Vitosha Martina presented a claim against Agribusiness for delays of the vessel and other expenses at the discharge port in Morocco, Agribusiness presented an indemnity claim to Copragri. Six years later, Agribusiness commenced arbitration of this claim, and an arbitration panel was selected without Copragri’s participation. Copragri objected to the arbitration on several grounds, primarily because the governing contracts between the parties were the sales agreements for grain cargoes, and not the bill of lading under which Agribusiness had initiated the New York arbitration. These objections were provided both to Agribusiness and to the arbitration panel. However, Copragri’s objections were ignored, and the arbitration panel issued an award to Agribusiness for $208,300. The award did not address Copragri’s various objections or issues of arbitrability or jurisdiction, nor did it include any legal citations.

Copragri thereafter filed a petition in the Southern District of New York to vacate the award, which the court granted. The court held that because Copragri was not a party to the bill of lading and therefore did not consent to arbitration in New York, the arbitration panel acted outside its scope and authority when issuing its award. The court also held that the arbitration panel’s failure to analyze or even address Copragri’s various objections — a number of which could have been outcome-determinative — constituted a manifest disregard for the law, further justifying vacatur.

Alabama District Court Grants Hospital’s Motion to Compel Arbitration in Dispute Against Third-Party Beneficiary to Medical Services Contract

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In 2015, the plaintiff was in a car accident that required emergency room medical treatment at Andalusia Regional Hospital. The plaintiff had health insurance at the time through United HealthCare, which maintained a contract for medical services with Andalusia. The plaintiff alleged that in connection with her treatment, Andalusia failed to submit her bills to United HealthCare or follow other required procedures, in violation of the medical services contract. As a third-party beneficiary, the plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit to enforce the terms of the contract and to recover damages incurred as a result of Andalusia’s alleged contractual violations. Andalusia was not named as a defendant in the class action, though the court later joined Andalusia as the sole defendant and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against all other parties.

After being added to the lawsuit, Andalusia moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause within the medical services contract between Andalusia and United HealthCare. The plaintiff opposed, arguing: (1) the arbitration clause does not bind her as a third-party beneficiary; (2) Andalusia’s motion to compel arbitration was untimely; and (3) the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. The court dismissed these arguments and granted Andalusia’s motion to compel arbitration.

Finding first that a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement existed between Andalusia and United HealthCare, the court ruled that the arbitration agreement was binding on the plaintiff as a third-party beneficiary. The court found that because a third-party beneficiary stands in the shoes of the signatories to a contract, the beneficiary is bound by the entirety of the contract that he or she wishes to enforce. Put simply, a “third-party beneficiary cannot accept the benefit of a contract, while avoiding the burdens or limitations of that contract.”

With respect to the timeliness argument, the court did not agree with the plaintiffs’ argument that Andalusia failed to initiate arbitration within one year of written notice of the dispute, as provided in the contract. The court noted that the plaintiff, as master of her own complaint, decided not to name Andalusia as a defendant to the lawsuit originally filed in May 2016, and thus there was no actual dispute between the plaintiff and Andalusia that could be arbitrated until the court joined Andalusia in March 2020. Holding otherwise — which would have required Andalusia to preempt the plaintiff and interject itself into the litigation to secure its arbitration rights — would have “absurd results” that conflict with arbitration law and “erode core values of the American legal system.”

Finally, the court found that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable. The court recognized that whenever parties operate at different levels of sophistication, there is a risk of disparate bargaining power — a requirement to finding the terms of an agreement unconscionable. However, the court reminded the plaintiff that as a third-party beneficiary, she stands in the shoes of United HealthCare, and there were no concerns of equal bargaining power as between United HealthCare and Andalusia.

North Carolina District Court Dismisses Action Where Plaintiff Had Full and Fair Opportunity to Pursue Claim Through Arbitration

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This case arose out of a dispute between the plaintiff and his former employer American National Red Cross for incorrect calculation of lost wages and health insurance premiums.

The plaintiff was hired by the Red Cross in February 2015 and terminated in September 2017. As a member of the Teamsters Local 71 union, the plaintiff brought a grievance against the Red Cross, which was submitted to arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the Red Cross.

After two arbitration hearings in May 2018, the arbitrator awarded the plaintiff reinstatement to his job as well as lost wages and benefits. Months later, the arbitrator clarified her ruling stating that the award included actual overtime earnings before the plaintiff’s termination. The parties agreed on the amounts to be paid in accordance with the arbitration award.

In November 2019, the plaintiff filed a complaint in North Carolina state court alleging that the arbitration award was miscalculated, and the Red Cross owed him additional compensation for additional wages and out-of-pocket medical expenses. The state court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the arbitrator retained jurisdiction over the subject matter. The plaintiff requested the arbitrator reopen the matter, and the arbitrator subsequently declined to award any additional compensation, since the parties agreed to the terms of the award and the Red Cross had paid accordingly. After another failed attempt at initiating suit in state court, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the Red Cross in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina for the incorrect calculation of lost wages and health insurance premiums.

The Red Cross moved to dismiss the complaint. The magistrate judge recommended that the motion be granted, finding that a valid arbitration agreement existed between the union and the Red Cross and that the disputed issue regarding miscalculation of the award was within the scope of the agreement. The magistrate judge also found that the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from pursuing his claim in federal court because, through his union representative, the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to pursue his claim under the collective bargaining agreement through arbitration. The magistrate judge emphasized that the arbitrator’s decision was final — she decided in the plaintiff’s favor and refused to reopen the proceeding because the parties agreed on the calculation of the award and the plaintiff actually received the award.

The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation was adopted, and the Red Cross’ motion to dismiss was ultimately granted.

Fonseca v. American National Red Cross, No. 3:20-cv-00526 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 1, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:20-cv-00526 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 17, 2021).

West Virginia District Court Rejects DirecTV’s Bid to Compel Arbitration Finding Breadth of Arbitration Agreement “Absurd” and “Unconscionable”

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In 2012, the plaintiff entered into a cellphone service contract with AT&T Mobility in which she agreed to arbitrate all disputes and claims with AT&T Mobility and its “subsidiaries, affiliates, agents, employees, predecessors in interest, successors, and assigns.” Three years later, AT&T Inc., the parent company of AT&T Mobility, acquired DirecTV, which, unlike AT&T Mobility, provided satellite television service, not cellphone service.

In 2017, the plaintiff sued DirecTV in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia claiming that DirecTV violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by calling her cellphone to advertise DirecTV products and services even though her phone number is listed on the National Do Not Call Registry. Recognizing that the plaintiff had never been a DirecTV customer, DirecTV nonetheless moved to compel arbitration, asserting that the dispute was covered by an arbitration agreement in the contract governing the plaintiff’s cellphone service from AT&T Mobility, a DirecTV “affiliate.”

The district court denied DirecTV’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the plaintiff’s claims did not fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. DirecTV appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the plaintiff had signed the arbitration agreement that included AT&T and its “affiliates.” The plaintiff argued that the agreement did not apply to DirecTV despite AT&T Mobility’s acquisition of the company in 2015.

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision, finding that the plaintiff formed an agreement to arbitrate with DirecTV and that the dispute fits within the broad scope of that agreement. However, noting the district court’s observation that a construction that does “not so limit the scope of the arbitration clause would be unconscionably overbroad,” the Fourth Circuit remanded the matter to further address unconscionability under West Virginia law.

On remand, the district court once again denied DirecTV’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration provision was “overbroad, absurd and unconscionable, and far exceeds anything contemplated by Congress in enacting the FAA.”

The district court determined that the provision was procedurally unconscionable, not only because of the “huge imbalance” between the AT&T conglomerate and the plaintiff who may be somewhat knowledgeable as to the TCPA but unlikely to have expertise in arbitration clauses but also because the provision was a “non-negotiable term” that the plaintiff was not permitted to opt out of or alter if she wanted to obtain AT&T Mobility’s services.

The district court also determined that the arbitration provision was substantively unconscionable because no reasonable AT&T Mobility customer would believe that by signing the arbitration agreement, she was consenting to arbitrate not only with AT&T Mobility but also with any entity that ever might share a corporate umbrella with AT&T Mobility. “[C]onstruing ‘affiliate’ to cover entities like DirecTV would lead to results so absurd that no reasonable person could have intended or anticipated that they would follow from her cell-phone service agreement.”

Mey v. DirecTV, LLC, No. 5:17-cv-00179 (N.D. W.Va. Feb. 12, 2021).