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You are here: Home / Archives for Brendan Gooley

Brendan Gooley

Supreme Court of Mississippi Enforces Arbitration Agreement

September 28, 2020 by Brendan Gooley

The Supreme Court of Mississippi has reversed and remanded a trial court’s refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement after rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments against arbitration. The Court also instructed the trial court to try to determine which arbitration agreement applied and, if that could not be determined, to look to the FAA to determine the specific terms of the arbitration.

Bettye Turner invested approximately $2 million with David Carrick, an investment broker employed by Morgan Stanley Smith Barney. Carrick subsequently moved to Stern, Agee & Leech, Inc. To facilitate the transfer of Turner’s funds to the new brokerage, Turner signed an account application. That referenced a client account agreement, which the account application stated (in bold, capital letters) “contained in numbered paragraph 22, a pre-dispute arbitration clause requiring all disputes under this agreement to be settled by binding arbitration.” Carrick subsequently left Stern, Agee & Leech, Inc. and joined Stifle, Nicolaus & Company, Inc. (“Stifel”). Turner (through her daughters) subsequently sued Stifel for mismanagement in Mississippi state court. Stifel moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied that motion.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed and remanded. Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion that there was “no contract, [and] thus no agreement to arbitrate” because the a agreement was “‘confusing and conflicting.'” The Supreme Court concluded that the “parties entered into a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement in the account application.” The account agreement itself, the Court held, was “sufficient to indicate the unambiguous intent of the parties to arbitrate.” The Court also rejected Turner’s argument that Stifel could not enforce the agreement because it was not a party to it. Turner alleged, the Court explained, that Stifel was a successor in interest to Stern, Agee & Leech, Inc., and Stifel could therefore invoke arbitration. Finally, the Court also rejected Turner’s argument that the provision was invalid because the account application referred to the arbitration clause as being in paragraph 22 of the account agreement, even though the arbitration clause was in paragraph 19 of one of the two account agreements in existence at that time. The Court remanded the case, however, for a determination regarding which of the two arbitration clauses contained in the two account agreements applied and, if that could not be determined, to apply the FAA to determine the specifics of arbitration.

David Chadwick Carrick et al. v. Bettye M. Turner et al., No. 2019-CA-00617-SCT (Miss. July 30, 2020)

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions

Eleventh Circuit Affirms Denial of Motion to Arbitrate Where Appellant Was Not a Party to Arbitration Agreement

August 20, 2020 by Brendan Gooley

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the denial of a motion to arbitrate where the appellants were not parties to the agreements containing arbitration clauses. The court also concluded that equitable estoppel did not apply to stop the plaintiffs from opposing arbitration.

A group of plaintiffs sued Herbalife, a global nutrition company that operates through a direct sales network of thousands of distributors, and some of Herbalife’s top distributors in a putative class action. The plaintiffs, who were also Herbalife distributors, claimed they were tricked into spending thousands of dollars to attend “circle of success” events and invest in their Herbalife distribution business by false promises of financial success from the top distributors.

Herbalife and the top distributors moved to compel arbitration. They cited arbitration clauses in the distributor agreements signed by some of the named plaintiffs and argued that the incorporation of Herbalife’s rules of conduct, which Herbalife amended to include an arbitration agreement, in the remaining distributor agreements rendered all the plaintiffs’ claims subject to arbitration. The district court disagreed and also refused to transfer the case to a different venue.

The top distributors appealed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of their motion to compel arbitration. None of the top distributors were parties to the distributor agreements, which were between the plaintiff distributors and Herbalife. The top distributors therefore could not invoke the arbitration clauses. The court also rejected the argument that the district court should have sent the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator. Threshold questions of arbitrability are only questions for the arbitrator if the parties agree to make them so, and in this case there was no agreement between the plaintiff distributors and the defendant top distributors.

The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the top distributors’ argument that the plaintiffs were equitably estopped from opposing arbitration. The plaintiffs’ complaint did not so much as mention a single term from the distributor agreements, which made it difficult to conclude that the plaintiffs relied on those agreements. The agreements were also not so intertwined with the plaintiffs’ claims, which relied on conduct at best one step removed from the agreements, that equitable estoppel applied. The court also concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s decision not to transfer the case to a different venue.

Lavigne v. Herbalife, Ltd., No. 18-14048 (11th Cir. July 29, 2020).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Contract Interpretation

Tenth Circuit Refuses to Vacate FINRA Arbitration Dismissal

August 18, 2020 by Brendan Gooley

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected a claimant’s effort to vacate the dismissal of his FINRA claim following his repeated failure to comply with various deadlines.

Zane Piston initiated a FINRA arbitration against his former employer, Transamerica Capital Inc., claiming that Transamerica Capital incorrectly described the reason for his termination.

The arbitration panel issued a scheduling order. Piston’s attorney failed to make various filings in accordance with the scheduling order and timely respond to motions filed by Transamerica Capital.

Transamerica Capital eventually moved to have Piston’s claim dismissed with prejudice due to these failures. The arbitration panel held a hearing at which it required Piston to show good cause as to why his claim should not be dismissed. Piston’s counsel indicated that he had undergone surgery, been traveling in Europe, and that his wife had been hospitalized and that he had therefore been unable to make timely filings. The panel concluded that Piston’s counsel had not shown good cause for his various failings and dismissed Piston’s claim with prejudice as a sanction.

Piston moved to vacate that decision. The district court denied Piston’s motion, and Piston appealed to the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Piston’s motion to vacate the dismissal of his claim. Piston primarily claimed that the arbitration panel exceeded its powers, disregarded the law, committed misconduct, and denied him a fair hearing because it allegedly dismissed his claim without a warning. The court rejected that claim. It concluded that the panel arguably interpreted and applied FINRA Rule 13212(c), which allows FINRA panels to dismiss a claim with prejudice as a sanction for material and intentional failure to comply with an order of the panel if prior warnings or sanctions proved ineffective. Whether the panel properly interpreted Rule 13212(c) was beyond the scope of the court’s review. The Tenth Circuit also rejected Piston’s claim that the panel misapplied the good cause standard, noting that Piston had to do more than show that the panel committed an error.

Piston v. Transamerica Capital, Inc., No. 19-1123 (10th Cir. July 21, 2020).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Arbitration Process Issues

Third Circuit Concludes Arbitration Agreement Is Unenforceable Under the Prospective Waiver Doctrine

July 30, 2020 by Brendan Gooley

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has refused to enforce an arbitration agreement because it impermissibly limited claims to those available under tribal law at the expense of federal statutory claims. The court also concluded that the relevant clause could not be severed from the agreement.

Christina Williams and Michael Stermel entered into payday loan agreements that provided that they were subject to and governed by tribal law. The agreements also “limit[ed] disputes to tribal laws and to tribal courts.” The agreements also contained arbitration agreements.

Williams and Stermel sued in federal court on behalf of a putative class for violations of federal and Pennsylvania law, claiming that the agreements charged unlawfully high interest rates. The defendants moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the defendants’ motion.

The Third Circuit affirmed. It explained “that arbitration is only appropriate so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate his or her statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum” and that “arbitration agreements that limit a party’s substantive claims to those under tribal law, and hence forbid federal claims from being brought, are unenforceable.”

Applying those principles to Williams’ and Stermel’s claims, the court evaluated the loan agreements and concluded that they impermissibly limited claims to tribal law claims. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the agreements were proper because they allowed borrowers to make claims under “such federal law as is applicable under the Indian Commerce Clause.” The court read the contract differently, as only allowing claims under tribal law, and also concluded that the restriction to the Indian Commerce Clause was improper because it precluded claims under other federal provisions, including a RICO claim asserted by the plaintiffs.

The Third Circuit also concluded that a severability clause did not save the balance of the arbitration agreement “because the prohibited waiver here [was] not severable.” The court concluded that clauses limiting claims to those available under tribal law was an essential term of the contract and that “the arbitration agreement’s clear reference to the exclusive application of tribal law is intertwined with the arbitration process and is central to it.” The court could not enforce arbitration without impermissibly rewriting the contract.

Williams v. Medley Opportunity Fund II, LP, No. 19-2058 (3d Cir. July 14, 2020).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Contract Interpretation

First Circuit Vacates Order Compelling Arbitration Over Arbitrator Selection Clause

July 28, 2020 by Brendan Gooley

The First Circuit vacated an order compelling arbitration after finding that the arbitrator selection clause was unconscionable. The court nevertheless remanded the case to the district court to determine if the selection clause was severable from the remainder of the arbitration agreement and whether arbitration could therefore proceed. The court also rejected several other challenges to the district court’s arbitration order, including claims based on a forum selection clause, a claim of waiver, and an argument that a statutory claim was not subject to arbitration.

Austin Trout, a boxer from New Mexico, sued the World Boxing Organization (WBO), which is based in Puerto Rico, in New Mexico state court for removing him from the rankings for a certain weight class. The WBO successfully removed the case and had it transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The WBO then moved to compel arbitration. While its motion was pending, Trout engaged in discovery, which prompted the WBO to do the same. The district court granted the WBO’s motion. It then denied Trout’s motion for reconsideration, which asserted for the first time that the WBO’s discovery precluded arbitration.

Trout appealed, and the First Circuit vacated and remanded.

The court first rejected Trout’s argument that the WBO’s championship regulations precluded arbitration because of a clause allowing claims to be brought in Puerto Rico state or federal court. The regulations contained two clauses. The first, a forum selection clause, provided that claims could only be maintained in Puerto Rico’s state or federal courts. The second, an arbitration clause, provided that “the sole and exclusive remedy for any claim” was an arbitration proceeding through the WBO’s Appeals and Grievance Committee. Trout claimed the former clause rendered the latter clause a nullity. The First Circuit disagreed, concluding that the former clause was more expansive than the latter and that the regulations read as a whole provided that only Puerto Rico courts could hear claims not subject to the arbitration clause.

The court also rejected Trout’s claim that the WBO waived its right to seek arbitration by (1) removing and transferring the case; and (2) engaging in discovery. The First Circuit explained that (1) the WBO did not waive its rights under the forum selection clause to select the forum to have its motion to compel decided; and (2) Trout’s discovery argument was improperly raised because it was first raised in a motion for reconsideration and it was meritless in any event because the WBO’s discovery “was not of a kind or of a scope that made it an abuse of discretion for a district court not to find an implicit waiver based on litigation conduct.”

The First Circuit then rejected Trout’s contention that his claim under the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act was not subject to arbitration. Although the court recognized that Congress can provide that certain statutory claims are not subject to arbitration, the act’s text did not “explicitly preclude[] arbitration” and Trout’s claim therefore failed.

The First Circuit agreed with Trout’s final claim that the WBO’s arbitrator selection provision was unconscionable under Puerto Rico contract law, however. That clause allowed the WBO’s president to designate three arbitrators. Even though the arbitrators could not be members of the WBO’s executive committee, they could, for example, be the president’s “direct aides.” Nevertheless, the First Circuit noted that the WBO’s regulations contained a savings clause that provided that “[i]f any of these Rules are determined to be unenforceable, the balance of these Rules shall remain in full force and effect.” Thus, the court left it to the district court to determine whether that clause allowed arbitration to proceed under a different selection process.

Trout v. Organización Mundial de Boxeo, Inc., No. 19-1068 (1st Cir. July 10, 2020).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Contract Interpretation

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