Alex Bein

Pennsylvania Federal Court Finds Forum Selection Clause in Services Agreement Between Insurer and Reinsurance Broker to Be Valid and Enforceable

April 25, 2024 by Alex Bein

In Housing & Redevelopment Insurance Exchange v. Guy Carpenter & Co., a Pennsylvania federal court considered the enforceability of a forum selection clause in a services agreement between Pennsylvania-based insurer Housing and Redevelopment Insurance Exchange (HARIE) and its reinsurance broker Guy Carpenter. In that case, the parties entered into an agreement establishing Guy Carpenter as HARIE’s reinsurance broker of record for a three-year period. The agreement included choice-of-law and forum selection clauses applying New York law and a New York forum “for the resolution of any disputes raising issues regarding the construction, meaning or enforcement of the terms of this agreement.”

HARIE did not renew the contract after that period, notifying Guy Carpenter that it would not serve as its broker of record for new reinsurance agreements. Guy Carpenter deducted $101,646.20 from a fiduciary account it held on behalf of HARIE, arguing it was entitled to that money under the terms of the agreement in the event of nonrenewal. HARIE then sued in Pennsylvania federal court to recover those funds. In the litigation, Guy Carpenter moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer, arguing (among other things) that the forum selection clause mandated that New York, not Pennsylvania, was the proper forum for the dispute.

The court’s decision focused primarily on the applicability and enforceability of the New York forum selection clause in the services agreement. In this regard, the court conducted a two-part analysis. First, the court considered whether the forum selection clause was valid and enforceable. The court agreed with Guy Carpenter and found that, while the terms of other contracts between the parties were also in issue, resolution of HARIE’s claims would require the court to construe the meaning or enforceability of the terms of the services agreement itself, such that the agreement’s New York forum selection clause governed the dispute.

Second, the court considered whether, even though the forum selection clause applied, public interest factors nonetheless militated against its enforcement in this case. In support of applying the forum selection clause, Guy Carpenter pointed out that the events of this case primarily took place in New York and that Guy Carpenter was based there. Guy Carpenter further pointed out that New York law governed the services agreement at issue. Discounting HARIE’s arguments that HARIE exclusively insures Pennsylvania insureds and that New York federal courts were slightly more congested than those in Pennsylvania, the court concluded that public interest factors weighed in favor of enforcing the New York forum selection clause.

Having found the forum selection clause valid and enforceable, and that public interest factors weighed in favor of its enforcement in this case, the court granted Guy Carpenter’s motion to the extent it sought transfer of the case to federal court in the Southern District of New York.

Housing & Redevelopment Insurance Exchange v. Guy Carpenter & Co., No. 3:23-cv-00996 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2024).

Tenth Circuit Remands Case for Arbitrability Determination, Concludes That State Court Decision Relied on by District Court No Longer Had Preclusive Effect

April 23, 2024 by Alex Bein

In Nu Skin Enterprises Inc. v. Raab, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the preclusive effect of a state trial court decision as it related to the arbitrability of the parties’ dispute under the Federal Arbitration Act.

As the trial court relayed, the underlying dispute involved beauty products marketer Nu Skin Enterprises and several of its distributors. The distributors filed an action against Nu Skin in Washington state court alleging, among other things, violations of Washington’s consumer protection act. Nu Skin then filed a separate action in federal court in the District of Utah, seeking to compel arbitration of the parties’ dispute in Utah pursuant to identical arbitration provisions in two of the parties’ agreements.

Before the Utah district court had a chance to rule on the question of arbitrability, the Washington state court denied Nu Skin’s motion to dismiss, holding that the dispute was not subject to arbitration under the parties’ agreements. Thereafter, the district court denied Nu Skin’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the district court was bound by the Washington state court’s earlier conclusion under the doctrine of issue preclusion. Nu Skin appealed this ruling to the Tenth Circuit.

In a procedural twist, a Washington appellate court reversed the state trial court’s decision, holding that the claims in the litigation were disputes subject to the arbitration agreements and remanding to the trial court for further proceedings, including a determination of whether the arbitration clause was unconscionable. In the related appeal that was then pending in the Tenth Circuit, both parties acknowledged that as a result of the Washington appellate court’s decision, the state trial court’s decision on arbitrability no longer had preclusive effect.

Effectively agreeing with both parties, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the state trial court decision on which the district court relied no longer had preclusive effect. The court then remanded the case to the district court to consider the issue of arbitrability anew, noting: “We express no view on any other issue in this case, including the possible preclusive effect of any other proceedings or decisions in the Washington courts.”

Nu Skin Enterprises Inc. v. Raab, No. 22-4068 (10th Cir. Mar. 19, 2024).

Eleventh Circuit Finds District Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Freeze Defendant’s Assets During Pendency of Action to Confirm Arbitration Award Against Him

December 13, 2023 by Alex Bein

In Noble Prestige Ltd. v. Galle, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court properly granted a preliminary injunction barring the defendants from dispersing assets during the pendency of the plaintiff’s motion to confirm an arbitration award rendered in its favor and against the defendants.

In that case, plaintiff Noble Prestige Ltd. issued a $500,000 loan to defendant Paul Horn to pursue litigation against AT&T, a telecommunications company. Under the terms of the loan, Horn agreed to repay Noble $5 million or 5% of his recovery from the litigation, whichever was greater. Noble also obtained a “security interest lien” in that portion of any recovery from AT&T. Thereafter, a Colorado state court found that Horn was unable to manage his own affairs due to various neurological disorders and placed Horn’s estate into a conservatorship. The Colorado court named defendant Craig Thomas Galle, Horn’s long-time attorney, as conservator of his estate.

The AT&T litigation ultimately settled for $57.5 million, and Noble sought to collect the $5 million it claimed it was owed by Horn under the loan. But the Colorado probate court refused to authorize Galle to repay the loan from Horn’s estate, and Noble initiated an arbitration proceeding in Hong Kong to enforce the terms of the loan. The arbitral panel found in Noble’s favor, and Noble filed a petition to confirm the award in federal court in the Southern District of Florida.

In the proceeding before the district court, Noble sought an order confirming the award rendered by the arbitral panel, and also sought an order freezing the AT&T settlement funds pending judgment in the confirmation proceeding. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the petition and issued an order freezing the AT&T settlement funds pending a final judgment as requested by Noble. The defendants appealed.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit declined to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, noting that the denial of the defendants’ motion was not a final, appealable judgment. But the court held that the asset freeze order was immediately appealable as a preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The court then vacated the preliminary injunction on two main grounds. First, the court applied the doctrine of “prior exclusive jurisdiction,” holding that because the Colorado probate court had already exercised exclusive in rem jurisdiction over Horn’s estate pursuant to Colorado probate law, the district court lacked the jurisdiction to assert equitable control over the same real property in the form of an asset freeze.

Second, the court held that the district court lacked authority to award preliminary injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), noting that Noble’s petition in the district court sought final relief only in the form of a legal remedy (confirmation of the arbitration award) and did not otherwise invoke the court’s equitable jurisdiction. In so holding, the court noted that the existence of Noble’s lien against the Horn estate, standing alone, was insufficient to invoke the court’s equitable jurisdiction, as Noble had not affirmatively petitioned the district court to exercise its equitable authority in the form of an order of foreclosure on that lien. The court otherwise took no position as to whether Noble could state a claim for foreclosure of the lien in the district court.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected Noble’s remaining arguments, vacated the asset freeze order, and remanded to the district court to address the merits of Noble’s pending petition to confirm the arbitration award.

First Circuit Holds That Motion to Reconsider Appealable Interlocutory Order Denying Motion to Compel Arbitration Is Not Appealable

August 3, 2023 by Alex Bein

In Powers v. Receivables Performance Management, LLC, the First Circuit Court of Appeals considered the defendant’s interlocutory appeal of the denial of a motion to reconsider an underlying denial of its motion to compel arbitration.

The case, a putative class action arising from defendant Receivables Performance Management’s (RPM) alleged improper debt collection practices, was brought in Massachusetts state court under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act. RPM moved to compel arbitration, which the state court denied. RPM then removed the action to federal court, where RPM again moved to compel arbitration. The district court treated this as a motion for reconsideration of the state court order denying arbitration, and RPM did not object. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, and RPM appealed.

On appeal, the First Circuit began its analysis by noting that even where a decision qualifies as an appealable interlocutory order, a motion to reconsider that underlying decision is not itself appealable “absent some newly available evidence, law, or a new stage of the proceedings.” But here, RPM had based its motion to reconsider on a “manifest error of law” rather than new evidence or law. Noting that RPM cited no case law to the contrary, the court concluded that while “manifest error of law” could serve as valid grounds for the district court to reconsider a motion to compel arbitration, “manifest error of law” does not provide a basis for appellate jurisdiction over that interlocutory reconsideration decision the way “newly available evidence or law” can. The First Circuit dismissed RPM’s appeal of the denial of its motion to reconsider accordingly.

Powers v. Receivables Performance Management, LLC, No. 22-1500 (1st Cir. June 8, 2023).

Alabama Supreme Court Clarifies Courts’ Authority to Issue Preliminary Injunctions in Disputes Subject to Arbitration

June 22, 2023 by Alex Bein

In its recent decision in Hyundai Construction Equipment Americas Inc. v. Southern Lift Trucks LLC, the Alabama Supreme Court considered whether the trial court erred in granting preliminary injunctive relief in a dispute that was otherwise subject to arbitration.

Southern Lift Trucks, a heavy construction equipment dealer, filed a state court action against Hyundai Construction, a construction equipment manufacturer, alleging that Hyundai breached two separate dealership agreements between the parties by forcing unreasonable restrictions on Southern Lift and entering into separate dealership agreements with Southern Lift’s competitors in its sales territory. Southern Lift asserted claims for breach of contract, tort, conspiracy, and declaratory judgment against Hyundai arising from Hyundai’s alleged actions. Southern Lift also sought a preliminary injunction maintaining the status quo and precluding Hyundai from either terminating the dealership agreements or entering into new agreements with Southern Lift’s direct competitors. Hyundai moved to dismiss the complaint and to compel arbitration.

After a hearing, the trial court granted Southern Lift’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The trial court subsequently denied Hyundai’s motion to compel arbitration. Hyundai appealed both decisions.

In reversing in part the trial court’s denial of Hyundai’s motion to compel arbitration, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the parties’ disputes under both dealership agreements were subject to arbitration, except for Southern Lift’s declaratory judgment claim, which fell under a narrow carve-out in the agreements’ arbitration provisions.

Turning to the trial court’s preliminary injunction ruling, the court declared that under established Alabama law, courts have jurisdiction to enter preliminary injunctive relief to maintain the status quo between the parties, even when the dispute is otherwise subject to arbitration. But because the parties’ dispute was subject to two separate lines of business and dealership agreements, the court analyzed Southern Lift’s entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief under each dealership agreement separately.

Regarding the first dealership agreement, which dealt with construction equipment sales, the court noted that no such construction equipment had been sold under the agreement for more than two years, such that Southern Lift could not establish irreparable harm or difficulty in calculating damages as required to obtain a preliminary injunction. The court thus reversed the trial court’s grant of a preliminary injunction as to the construction equipment agreement.

As to the second dealership agreement, which dealt with forklift sales, the court noted that Southern Lift had provided evidence of significant and consistent sales of forklifts and other equipment subject to the agreement. Southern Lift also presented evidence that its reputation, goodwill, and customer base were being negatively affected by Hyundai’s complained-of actions. The court found that if it were to reverse the trial court’s entry of a preliminary injunction as to the forklift agreement on these facts, the court risked providing a “hollow victory” to Southern Lift should it ultimately prevail, whether in arbitration or before the court. As such, the court affirmed the trial court’s entry of a preliminary injunction as to the forklift agreement. This was so, notwithstanding the court’s determination that the majority of the dispute with respect to both agreements was subject to arbitration.